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JFK Assassination Hearings - E. Aschkenasy & Mark Weiss, H.B. McClain
Chief Counsel Professor Robert Blakey segues to calling the next witness by explaining how the acoustics committee also wanted to figure out the location of the motorcycle which recorded the assassination. H.B. McClain was the driver of that motorcycle and Blakey introduces him.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 26, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean.
Samuel Dash, attorney. But so far as Liddy was concerned, Mr. Dean, your actions were consistent, were they not, with his getting the impression that you were merely establishing deniability for the Attorney General and The White House should the plan go forward. Is that not true? John Dean. I don't know if Mr. Liddy had that impression or not. Samuel Dash, attorney. Would it be consistent with his having that impression? John Dean. He could have well have had that impression, yes.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, Testimony of James W McCord (Jim McCord)
Senator Edward Gurney (R - Florida). Can we find out more about these other calls where he heard this same voice? What were they, what did they involve, when were they? James McCord. Sir, I can give them to you now or at the end of the statement, as you prefer. I am willing to do either that the committee desires. Senator Edward Gurney (R - Florida). Well, they're very important, I would like to have them now. If that's acceptable to the Chairman. Senator Sam Ervin (D North Carolina). Senator, if he reads the statement, he states in his statement, it is on the 8th of January and first he said that his lawyer, Mr. Alch, told him that Bittman said he would receive a call from a friend he had known from the White House and he said at 12:30 pm the same day, that is after midnight on the January 8, that he received this phone call from an unidentified individual. Senator Edward Gurney (R - Florida). Yes, Mr. Chairman, what he also said was that he recognized the voice because he had heard it in previous phone calls and my question was when and what were these previous phone calls about. This is a very important matter. James McCord. There were two or three previous phone calls. The story gets a bit complex. I will be glad to do it either way you prefer. I believe it would have more continuity to finish the statement first, but if you desire to do it now we'll do so. Samuel Dash, attorney. To clarify it for Senator Gurney, do you know the voice, do you know the identity? James McCord. I heard the voice before, I do not know the identity of the man who called. Senator Howard Baker (R Tennessee). I think it won t take long to do what Senator Gurney wishes to do, what he is talking about. I think it easier to go ahead with the question then it is to argue about it. I would suggest that Senator Gurney ask that limited question at this time.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 27, 1973
[00.29.42-GURNEY continues to challenge DEAN'S testimony on the subject of raising money to buy the silence of HUNT and other Watergate defendants] Senator GURNEY. Well, as I understand your testimony now, you did discuss this business, of raising the money for bail, for support, for attorneys' fees. Mr. DEAN. That is correct.. Senator GURNEY. And you did -not, discuss specifically that this Money was being raised to pay for silence. Is that correct,?, Mr. DEAN. Well, Senator, I can't recall specifically what I said, but I felt quite confident that Mr. Kalmbach understood, Given the whole procedure that was being set up, and the, use of Mr. Ulasewicz, that this was not for humanitarian purposes, we might say. [00.30.16-KEY flaw in GURNEY'S theory] Senator GURNEY. Who suggested the use of Mr. Ulasewicz? Mr. DEAN. Mr. Kalmbach raised that himself. He said he was the only man he, would trust,. Senator GURNEY. What, did you say and plan or what was the understanding about the instructions that were going to be, given to Mr. Kalmbach from time to time? Mr. DEAN. I told him that Mitchell had suggested that he, get his detailed instructions from Mr. LaRue, who had all the facts and details. I did not have them. Senator GURNEY. You mentioned a, meeting in your office. I don't recall the date now, but Mr. LaRue came there for the purpose, I think, of turning over some money. Is that at correct? Mr. DEAN,. No, it wasn't to turn over money: it was to explain to Mr. Kalmbach the nature of the, deliveries. He had a large, sheet of paper--when I say large, it was probably a folded 8 by 10. Mr. Kalmbach took notes and put, into his own code on a very small piece of paper the information that Mr. LaRue had and put this in his wallet. Senator GURNEY. Did you set up that meeting? Mr. DEAN. As I recall, Mr. Kalmbach had asked me if LaRue and he could meet in my office, and I said fine. Senator GURNEY. You don't recall that you set up the meeting? Mr. DEAN. I don't recall the mechanics of the meeting, Mr. LaRue had a White House, pass. He had been on the White House staff before. I didn't really know him when he was at the White House and didn't know he had a pass until he was able to come into my office without being cleared. Mr. Kalmbach also had a pass, so it was very easy for them to come to my office and meet. Senator GURNEY. Were there any other people present? Mr. DEAN. NO, sir. Senator GURNEY. Just the three of you? Mr. DEAN. That is correct. Senator GURNEY. My understanding of your previous testimony is that at the meeting, you didn't pay any attention to it at all and they just talked among themselves--- Mr. DEAN. Well, I wouldn't say--I -wasn't totally unaware of what they were talking about. I can't recall specifically the totals, the dollar amounts. I did take some telephone calls and return some, because Mr. Kalmbach was being very careful in deciding how he was going to decipher down this larger list into a smaller list that he could use himself. [00.32.34-GURNEY turns to challenging DEAN'S testimony about meetings with NIXON during the coverup period, specifically DEAN'S assertions that NIXON was aware of the COVERUP] Senator GURNEY. Let's turn now to the September 15 meeting with the President and Mr. Haldeman and yourself. That of course is a very important meeting, because, I understand from your testimony that it was at that meeting that you felt that the President knew all about Watergate, is that right? [00.33.07] Mr. DEAN. Well, I will say this, when I came in, the indictments had been announced. He acted as if it 'was a very cordial circumstance. The President asked me to sit, down and told me, that Bob had told him What I had been doing and he expressed appreciation for it. He, you know, indicated that he was--I could tell, you know you can tell, when you are talking- with the President, when he understands or not. I learned that even more later when I had more dealings with him, when I knew something would come up that he knew nothing about and I would have to go into greater detail. Senator GURNEY. Did you discuss the criminal cases that were coming on for trial? -we did or it was the criminal case at that point. Mr. DEAN. Yes, -was the entire seven were being -moved forward as a trial. Senator GURNEY. Did you discuss the civil suits that were filed by the Democrats? Mr. DEAN. Yes, we did. Senator GURNEY. Did you discuss the Common Cause suit that had been filed by -Common Cause? Mr. DEAN. That is correct. Senator GURNEY. Did you discuss the Patman hearings that -were imminent? Mr. DEAN. That is correct, we did. Senator GURNEY. Any idea how long these discussions took? Mr. DEAN. I would say that the entire meeting lasted 30 minutes or some, 40 minutes. [00.34.36]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, July 10, 1973
[00.58.59-Sen. TALMADGE interrogating MITCHELL] Senator TALMADGE. It's been observed in the press, in Mr. Dean's testimony, that Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman tried to smoke You out, and get you to take the blame for this whole a affair, that you were shaken by the circumstances, and now isolated from the, President. Would you like to comment on that? Mr. MITCHELL. -Now where does this is come from? Senator TALMADGE. Dean, among others, and various--- Mr. MITCHELL. This is not, a direct quote from Dean. You are also reading Evans and Novak and a few others. Senator TALMADGE. Newspapers, Newspaper comment. Mr. MITCHELL. And a few other throw-ins of hypothetical---- Senator TALMADGE. Perhaps one of the contributing factors to it is the last time you visited the White House you didn't even see the President as I understand it. Mr. MITCHELL. That was my exact, determination that I should not under the circumstances. Senator TALMADGE. That is what I understood you to say. Mr. MITCHELL. Yes, that is what I did say. Senator TALMADGE'. So you have not been isolated from the President? Mr. MITCHELL. I have--well let me answer your question first: There has been running through 'Mr. Dean's testimony on a number of occasions the reference that, you know. "Mitchell come forward and take the blame for all of this and this will solve all of the problems and of course I have been meeting with these people from time to time during this period. But the only one I have ever heard that story from is Dean. Neither Haldeman or Ehrlichman or either Colson or Shapiro have come to me with that story so the only one I have ever heard from is Dean. [01.00.24] Senator TALMADGE. One thing I can't understand, Mr. Mitchell. As I understand it., you have been probably closer associated -with the President than probably any man. You were his law partner, probably his most trusted confidant and adviser. You had immediate access to the White House at, any time, to the President's office, including a direct line. Is that a fair statement? Mr. MITCHELL. It is extremely complimentary. Senator TALMADGE. It, is meant to be complimentary. Mr. MITCHELL. I think it is made a little higher than it, might be, Senator TALMADGE. NOW. you have been in public office in positions of high responsibility in Government. I have had that privilege also as Governor of my state, and now for 16 1/2 years in the U.S. Senate. To my mind, the first requirement of a subordinate and adviser and confidant, in any capacity is absolute and implicit trust. If they see anything going wrong involving their superior that needs corrective action, they report, it instantly. When you found out all these crimes and conspiracies and cover-ups were being committed. why on Earth didn't you walk into the President's office and tell him the truth? [01.01.51] Mr. MITCHELL. It wasn't a question of telling him the truth. It was a question of not involving him at, all so that he could go on through his campaign without being involved in this type of activity, and I am talking about the White House horror part particularly. As I have testified this morning, I was sure that, knowing Richard Nixon, the President, as I do, I would just, lower the boom on all of this matter and it would come, back to hurt him and it would affect him in his reelection. And that is the basis upon which I made the decision. And apparently, others concurred with it, Now, I am not speaking for them. It, may very well be that I was wrong, that it was a bad matter of judgment. [01.02.37] Senator TALMADGE. Am I to understand from your response that you placed the expediency of the next election above your responsibilities as an intimate to advise the President, of the peril that surrounded him? Here -was the deputy campaign director involved, here -were his two closest associates in his office involved, all around him were people involved in crime, perjury, accessory after the fact, and you deliberately refused to tell him that. Would you state that the expediency of the election was more important? Mr. MITCHELL. Senator, I think you have put it exactly correct. In my mind, the reelection of Richard Nixon, compared with what was available on the other side, was. so much more important, that I put it In just, that context. Senator TALMADGE. Do you think anything short of a trial for treason would have prevented his election? Mr. MITCHELL. I beg your pardon, Senator? Senator TALMADGE. Do you think anything short of a trial for treason would have prevented his election? Mr. MITCHELL. Well, it depends on what area we are talking about. Mr. Thompson and I went through that, and of course. depending upon what time and what area It -was in. Senator or TALMADGE. . Thank you. Mr. Mitchell. I have no further questions at this time. [01.03.54-LEHRER in studio] LEHRER states that Sen. TALMADGE has looked into MITCHELL'S motivations, finding a mix of politics and personal loyalty. Sen. GURNEY will be next. [PBS Network ID] [01.04.19-TAPE OUT]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 13, 1973 (1/2)
[00.52.17] Senator INOUYE. The next series of questions I would like to inquire into, Mr. Secretary, may sound a bit naive coming from a politician, but, I think it would be most helpful to the people of the United States if we had some explanations. Many of us who spend much of our lives in Washington have not been unaware of cash contributions. Yesterday, you testified that "naturally, we wanted most of our contributions in by April 7." Mr. STANS. Did I say that, Senator? Senator INOUYE. Yes. Mr. STANS. I would question the record on that, because there was no chance that we could get most of our money in by April 7. Senator INOUYE. Was there not a mad rush to get as much as, you could by then? Mr. BARKER. Senator Inouye, could you refer to the page or something so we could check that if we Senator INOUYE. I am sorry. Let me put it this way: Was there a mad rush to get as much money as you could before April 7? Mr. STANS. Mad rush is not the correct word for it. It is a characterization that is really not very fair. Senator INOUYE. Mr. Sloan has testified that in the last 4 or 5 days, they were just deluged, and I believe he used the word "avalanche." Mr. STANS. There is no question about that. There was an avalanche, of money in the last 5 days before April 7. What I did when I took office on February 15 was to plan an effort to reach as many people as possible among the larger contributors and tell them the option they had of giving their contribution before April 7 and having the right of confidentiality or giving it later. Many people said, "I do -not care, I will give it later." Now, there was an advantage in getting early money. Anyone who has ever run for office knows that the early Money is the hardest to get. I took advantage of that opportunity to visit a number of cities in the country, met with a lot of people, urged those who were working with me in the States to make it clear that there was an option to the individual contributor. Senator INOUYE. Why would it contributor desire, as you say, confidentiality or anonymity? Mr. STANS. Oh, there are a number of reasons, Senator. Senator INOUYE. Why don't we tell the people of the United States? Mr. STANS. I would be very happy to tell the people of the United States, because I think contributors have been very badly maligned in their desire for confidentiality. One is that sometimes it affects relationships with employers, with unions. Sometimes, and this is, I think, the most important point, it, makes them a target, It makes them a target, for a great many other political campaigns. It makes them a target, for charitable drives of all types. And many people want to make their contribution and not be that kind of a target. Senator INOUYE. Aren't we, all targets for charitable drives? [00.55.36--HUMOR] Mr. STANS. Yes, but you are a much better target if it is known that you gave $25,000 to Senator Inouye's campaign than you are--- Senator INOUYE. That will be the day. Mr. STANS [Continuing). That you are if that is not known, Now, there are some people, frankly, who give to both sides, both candidates. There are some like Mr. Dwayne Andreas, who is a close friend of Hubert Humphrey and contributed to his campaign, but was also a friend of the President and wanted to contribute to his campaign. So he wanted anonymity. The greatest disservice that is done to people is to assume that because a man wants anonymity that he has a secret, sinister motive it, doing so. Senator INOUYE. As an accountant, I am certain from your standards that you have applied to yourself, you must have questioned the receipt of cash. I have been told that most accountants would like to have everything clean and proper, that everything should be in writing. Mr. STANS. Well, lot me answer that in two ways. Senator INOUYE. Is cash an important element in political elections? Mr. STANS. I do not think it is an important, element at all. I testified yesterday that the cash receipts that were taken in before I came with the committee and after amounted to about 3 percent of the total receipts of the campaign and that the disbursements in cash amounted to only 2 percent of the total disbursements of the campaign. And that includes the $350,000 that went, to the White House. So cash is not an important element. Let me say this. Contrary to what has been said on one or more occasions, we did not, prefer getting cash. We did not ever solicit anyone to contribute in cash. It was the option of the contributors to give us money in cash. We had no need for it in substantial amounts, and as I said. yesterday, we put in the bank about half of the money that we received in cash. So the choice was that, of the contributor and not of our committee to receive money in cash. [00.58.02]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 14, 1973
[00.42.40] Senator "MONTOYA. Well, had he received--- Mr. MAGRUDER. the procedure was for him to receive the copies of the, memorandums, I would be discussing -with Mr. Mitchell and when Mr. Mitchell made the decision, I would call him and say, here are the decisions on those. Memorandums. Now this gave him an opportunity in the, intervening time, if he wanted to have some comment or Mr. Haldeman had some comments to some of the proposals, he could get to Mr. Mitchell directly and comment before Mr. Mitchell had made a decision. Senator MONTOYA. Well, did you assume at any time in your meetings with Mr. Mitchell that, in view of the fact. that you had supplied Mr. Strachan with these memorandums that some somebody in the White House, had approved? Mr. MAGRUDER. Again, I think it is, to be perfectly clear, Mr. Mitchell had the final authority on all budgetary activities and all activities at, the campaign committee. Mr. Haldeman worked with him on a basis that if there were, things that, he, may have, disagreed with he would dismiss then, directly with Mr. Mitchell, So when the Copies -went to Mr. Strachan, they were for Mr. Haldeman's benefit, and he could then comment to Mr. Mitchell or myself if he felt, it -were appropriate or if he disagreed with an approach that was being taken. but Mr. Mitchell, I think in fairness to everyone, the only authority for any budgetary request any political activities, and I think there are many documents that I know the grand jury has that indicate the approval down to as low as $500. had to go to Mr. Mitchell. [00.44.17] Senator MONTOYA. Then is it your testimony that if Mr. Haldeman had not approved of this plan, that he would have communicated the disagreement To Mr. Mitchell before the final approval? Mr. MAGRUDER. He could have. If he did not agree with it. and knew about it, he could have commented to Mr. Mitchell before or after. It Would not, necessarily be a pattern; that he commented to Mr. Mitchell on different occasions. Senator MONTOYA. Well, was it nor your understanding that any time you gave Mr. Strachan any memorandums that that, was destined to Mr. Haldeman? MAGRUDER. Senator, the memo was not necessarily destined. The question raised in the memo would be translated normally if Mr. Strachan thought it was important. He had the discretion. Senator MONTOYA. Well, Can we assume as reasonable men that Mr. Haldeman knew advance prim to the Mitchell approval of these particular plans ? Mr. MAGRUDER. Senator I think I have answered that, as best, I can. I assumed that, but that is unfair. to Mr. Haldeman to say that he knew about it, because I do not know that. I did pass it to Mr., Strachan and if Mr. Strachan did bring it up with -Mr. Haldeman, then he would have had time to comment to Mr. Mitchell on it. That is correct,. But I think it is unfair. for me to make a statement that, I have no direct, knowledge of. Senator MONTOYA. Well, he had advance knowledge of these plans from before January 27, when the first meeting occurred---- Mr. MAGRUDER. That is right. Senator MONTOYA. [continuing]. Up until March 30, when the meeting in Key Biscayne occurred and the final plan was approved. He had all this time. did he not? Mr. MAGRUDER. Mr. Strachan did, Senator. Senator MONTOYA. Would you not assume that Mr. Haldeman had similar advance notice of this particular plan? Mr. MAGRUDER. Senator, I think that I have got to be absolutely clear here that I have answered this I think for all of the Senators who have asked this question and I understand your reasoning,. I cannot specifically comment to the direct approval of these plans or even knowledge of these plans for Mr. Haldeman. I do not know that he knew of these plans beforehand, I only know that I discussed them and sent a copy as I have stated, to Mr. Strachan. Senator MONTOYA. When YOU started the practice Of sending copies through Mr. Strachan it was your understanding that these copies were destined to Mr. Haldeman? Mr. MAGRUDER. It was my understanding that Mr. Strachan would pass on to Mr. Haldeman What he deemed important for Mr. Haldeman's decision or concern. Senator MONTOYA. Now, Mr. Magruder, -would you say that you were acquainted with most of these projects that, especially those on which you kept a little file, know as Gemstone? Mr. MAGRUDER. Senator, when you say acquainted-- Senator MONTOYA. Acquainted or aware, of the projects. Mr. MAGRUDER. Well, specifically the. Watergate break-in, yes, I was specifically aware of that project. Senator MONTOYA. Did you have anything in your files with respect to Ruby I? Mr. MAGRUDER. My recollection of I think, Ruby I and Ruby 2 and Crystal were code, names, I think that Mr. Liddy used for the various bugs. I am not sure if that is correct. I think that is what it was. [00.47.51]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 26, 1973
[00.58.40] Senator WEICKER. May I ask you this question in relation to 'Mr. Doherty? Was there any discussion at this time -about this unit's first head being Mr. Earl Sharp? Mr. DEAN. Yes. there -was. Mr. Ehrlichman was aware of this as well and Judge Sharp, who was a friend of Mr. Ehrlichman's apparently had been--as I recall, he was an elected judge and he either hadn't been reelected or something of that nature, an appointment had run out. and he was not currently sitting on the bench anywhere, and Mr. Ehrlichman thought this would be an excellent thing for him to do and invited him to Come to Washington, We had a number of meetings on it and the more he looked at it, the less he decided he wanted to get involved in it,. Senator WEICKER. So that the first head Was Mr. John Doherty? Mr. DEAN. I believe that is correct Senator WEICKER. Did you hold any discussions in your office with Mr. Sharp or Mr. Doherty relative to the IEC? Mr. DEAN. I am sure probably with both individuals yes. Senator WEICKER. And what other persons would have "been present at those meetings? Mr. DEAN-. Well, I can't recall anybody else being present when I talked to Judge Sharp, I do know that when he decided that he wasn't interested because, one, he felt he didn't know much about this field, that he would have a whole education to become acquainted with it--I think he spent a couple of weeks looking into the matter. I think he learned that, it was going to be some sort of, going to be a secret operation that he would be running in the Department of Justice, he wanted to be able to explain what he Was doing to people back home, and he didn't want to have to say, I can't tell you what I am doing in Washington. We had a number of discussions about other assignments for him and he did some very valuable work for my office in connection With some trade matters that had come to my office for resolution. Senator WEICKER. Now, Mr. Dean, then Mr. Doherty was the, first head and he was succeeded by whom? Mr. DEAN. I believe Mr.' Wells. Senator WEICKER. Bernard Wells? Mr. DEAN. Yes. Senator WEICKER. All right. So from the time of your memorandum at the time of your talk with Haldeman as to the setting up of the mechanics of the operation, administering of details of the operation, does it come as any surprise to you, that listed under the Office of Analysis and Planning in the Internal Security Division of the Justice Department as of April 15, 1972, is a listing of Bernard Wells, Executive Director, IDIU, with James McGrath and Joyce Webb listed under that? Is this basically, then, the plan that is suggested in your memorandum to John Mitchell? The ink marks and the scribblings are mine and my staff's Mr. DEAN. I can't glean an awful lot, from this chart. Senator WEICKER. There is no mention of IEC. there, is there? Mr. DEAN. No, there is not, and the documents that all came to me were clearly marked "IEC" on them when they came over. Senator WEICKER. And they came over from -Mr. Wells? Mr. DEAN. They came over from Mr. Wells. Senator WEICKER. Would you read to the committee what Mr. Wells, is listed as in that document?' Mr. DEAN. Executive Director, IDIU. [01.02.43-more domestic intelligence arrangements] Senator WEICKER. You have, also stated that to the best of your knowledge, no illegal activities were conducted by the IEC? I would like to get into the matter of your contacts, Let me ask you one question before you go on to your contacts with the Internal Security Division. Statements have been made that there was a rescission by the President of the 1970 plan. Why all this business? Mr. DEAN-. Well, as I said, at one point--I do not know about the rescission. That is something that I do not know. I knew that there Was a squabble going on between principally Mr. Huston, representing the White House, and the FBI. Mr. Huston talked to me on a number of occasions about, the matter. I knew that Mr. Mitchell, when I talked With him about it, both telephonically and when I met with him, opposed to the grand plan that is in that manual, and I think what Mitchell and I decided was the best course was to do the minimum amount possible, that might satisfy people that, something was being done. And that was to create the IEC. Senator WEICKER. Now, it is possible. then, that one. of two things might have happened. Either there could have been a rescission by President, the word of which rescission ---- [01.04.37-TAPE OUT]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, July 10, 1973
[00.12.35-DASH interrogates MITCHELL about his role in launching the Watergate breakin, authorizing and financing] Mr. DASH. Now, Mr. Mitchell, were you aware that on or about May 27, 1972, there -was in fact a break-in of the Democratic National Committee headquarters at the Watergate? Mr. MITCHELL. No, sir. Mr. DASH. And did you know of the code name, "Gemstone" or any of the wiretap proof proofs that came from the, break-in? Mr. MITCHELL. Not until a great deal later down the road, Mr. Dash. Mr. DASH. When you say that, how far down the road? Mr. MITCHELL. I am not, quite certain. I believe. it would be substantially down the road. Mr. DASH. Before June 17 or after June 17? Mr. MITCHELL. Oh, much after June 17. Mr. DASH. Were you aware that, Mr. Magruder kept a so-called Mitchell Gemstone file as well as a Haldeman Gemstone file, prior to June 17? Mr. MITCHELL. I have heard testimony here, Mr. Dash, that I believe it was Mr. Reisner, that they kept a Mitchell file, in which documents would be placed for Mr. Magruder to come up and discuss them with. me. Mr. DASH. Yes, I believe Mr. Magruder has also testified about that. [00.13.44] Mr. MITCHELL. Yes, about a file that would have documents, memorandums et cetera. et cetera. I am not aware of anybody testifying to the fact that there was a special Mitchell gemstone file. Mr. DASH. Well. the Mitchell file did include. on that testimony. You will recall, that it included gemstone documents. Mr. MITCHELL. I recall Reisner stating that he had put the documents in there, yes. [00.14.09-MITCHELL tries very hard to act honest] Mr. DASH. But do you recall Mr. Magruder testifying that he had taken these documents and showed them to you? Mr. MITCHELL. I recall it very vividly because A happens to be a palpable, damnable lie. Mr. DASH. What is the lie, Mr. Mitchell? Mr. MITCHELL. Well. let me lay out the scenario for you, because my answer will come in the scenario. I paid particular attention to this because of the fact that Mr. Magruder said that at his regular 8:30 morning meeting, sometime within a week or a week and a half from the time of the initial break-in, that he brought certain documents to my office at the regular 8:30 meeting to display them to me and that I was dissatisfied with them and that I called Gordon Liddy up to my office and raised holy hell with him about the fact that, they were not the type of information that was wanted. [00.15.11] Now. let me go back and pick up the facts with respect to the meeting First of all, I had an 8:15 meeting every day over at the White House in connection with activities that were governmental, but I sat in on, Second. if you have my logs. that are very, very accurate and correct, you will note that there was no meeting in the morning during that period when Mr. Magruder and I were alone during that meeting. Third, I have never seen or talked to Mr. Liddy from the 4th day of February 1972 until the 15th day of June either in person or On the telephone. [00.15.58] Fourth, I would like to point out that Mr. Dean's testimony is that When he first debriefed 'Mr. Liddy on the 19th of June, Mr. Liddy told Mr. Dean that Magruder the one that had pushed him continue the second entry on the 17th of June and I cannot conceive Of anybody, if they had Mitchell as a scapegoat, why they would get down to Magruder and use him as the one that had pushed him. so I am using that dialogue to point out the reasons why this meeting could not and did not take place. [00.16.40] Mr. DASH. Just taking that dialogue, you were aware that there was no love lost between Mr. Liddy and 'Mr. Magruder and he might well have, wanted to, since we are speculating, put the blame on Mr. Magruder. Mr. MITCHELL. As I am stating Mr. Dash, I never saw Mr. Liddy from the 4th of February until the 15th of June and I cannot tell you whether there was love lost or not. I think there is testimony that if they had a controversy, it should be kept away from me and settled at lower echelons. Mr. DASH. Well, if Mr. Liddy did not see you, did Mr. Magruder show you the Gemstone file, as he indicated he did? Mr. MITCHELL. No; he, did not and I just got through denying that fact that he did and I am pointing out the reasons why he did not because of the circumstances and time in which he -is talking about the meetings that are referred to in those logs. a [00.17.31]
August 4, 1994 - Part 1
(09:15:50) TESTIMONY OF THOMAS F. McLARTY, III, COUNSELOR TO THE PRESIDENT, FORMER CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT, WASHINGTON, DC Mr. McLARTY. Mr. Chairman, Senator DAmato, and other Members of the Committee, my name is Mack McLarty, and I currently serve as Counselor to the President As you know, it was my privilege to serve as the President's Chief of Staff from the time of his inauguration until June 17th of this year. I testified before the House Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, and I provided a written statement to that Committee. And, Mr. Chairman, as you have already discussed, I have requested that I be permitted to attach that statement to this one. I would like to simply summarize that testimony here so that we can move promptly to your questions. Let me say at the outset that the White House very much respects the role of this Committee and its oversight responsibilities. As you know, the President instructed all White House personnel to cooperate fully with your inquiry and to appear voluntarily when asked to do so. As you also are aware, a number of independent authorities have reviewed the contacts between the Treasury and the White House concerning the Madison matter. The Special Counsel, the Grand Jury, the Office of Government Ethics and the White House Counsel. And they have all determined that the contacts violated no laws. 271 The Office of Government Ethics and the White House Counsel, Mr. Cutler, examined the contacts in light of ethical standards, which of course are tougher than legal ones. I specifically asked Mr. Cutler to do that and to do so in hindsight. Both he and the Office of Government Ethics concluded that no one acted unethically. Even if I am repeating the obvious, I want to make certain that Congress and the American people understand a very critical point. No one attempted to influence the RTC's decisionmaking. No one attempted to influence the RTC's decision on whether or when to bring claims against individuals in connection with the failure of Madison. As we apply hindsight to these events, however, it is obvious to all of us that some of the contacts were unwise. The White House has already implemented Mr. Cutler's suggestions, and they will assure in the future that all contacts with regulatory agencies about on- going reviews and investigations will be approved by or, even better, limited to White House Counsel. I would like to emphasize, as I did before the House Committee, the importance of keeping the Madison Whitewater matter in perspective with some backdrop. The period the Committee is reviewing extends roughly from the end of September to the beginning of March. And during that period, the White House was extraordinarily busy and very productive, even though some time, of some White House personnel, was spent responding to various Whitewater inquiries and controversies. Specifically, we concluded the North American Free Trade Agreement and lifted the sanctions against South Africa. We reinstituted the Super 301 Trade Powers. We obtained a GATT agreement which, as all of you know on this Committee, had been outstanding for a number of years, and the President convened the APEC conference in Seattle and brought our G-7 allies to Detroit for a major conference on jobs. At the same time, the President was traveling to Europe, bringing his leadership to NATO and outlining his partnership for peace initiative, and holding major talks with President Yeltsin and other Russian leaders. On the heels of last year's economic legislation, which was critical to getting our fiscal household in better order, we set out to improve the social fabric of our country. Working closely with the Members of Congress, we enacted major educational reform, including Goals 2000.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee Hearings on Presidential Campaign Activities, May 24, 1973 - Testimony of Gerald Alch
Mr. DASH. Now, for example, are you aware that in December, which is the very month you raised the question of CIA involvement with McCord, that Mr. McCord sent Mr. John Caulfield a note complaining of a White House effort to blame the CIA for Watergate and threatening "That all the trees in the forest would fall if this effort continued." Were you aware of this? Mr. ALCH. I was not. Mr. DASH. So it is no fiction, really, that Mr. McCord was deeply concerned over what he believed was a conspiracy to have him implicate the CIA in the Watergate case? Mr. ALCH. I have no knowledge to contradict that statement by Mr. McCord. Mr. DASH. Actually, according to your own statement, when you first raised the CIA involvement with Mr. McCord in the Monocle Restaurant, you said he did not really respond to it, but launched into a complaint about how the White House was treating the CIA. I think that was your statement. Mr. ALCH. That is correct.
1973 - Watergate Hearings - James McCord
Senate hearing room. Chief Counsel Samuel Dash: "....with your reading of the statement, Mr. McCord." U.S. Senator Sam Ervin (D-NC) interject: "what Mr. McCord says Caulfield told him is admissible to show what Caulfield did and said to induce the witness to take action or reframe to take an action. It's not relevant to prove any...it's not relevant to prove any connection with the White House or the President." James McCord, former Security Director for the Nixon Re-election Committee, is given permission to proceed reading his statement.
Washington Week - WW 4518 - "Harriet Miers"
Show host Gwen Ifill introduces topic of White House counsel Harriet Miers withdrawing her own Supreme Court justice nomination. Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee U.S. Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA) speaking on the Senate floor: "I do regret that our Constitutional process was not completed. Instead of a hearing before the Judiciary Committee and a debate on the Senate floor, Ms. Miers' qualifications were subjected to a one-sided debate in news releases, press conferences, radio and TV talk shows and the editorial pages."
Lawmakers March 15, 1984 Aid to Central America
Paul Duke reports that Reagan won approval from the Senate Appropriations Committee for emergency military aid to Central America, but still must get through the House where many object to the administration s tactic of attaching the El Salvador funds to a bill for African Famine Relief funds.
Lawmakers 8/04/1983 Congress and Courts
Robert Weiner, Former Staff Director, House Committee on Aging, and the only way you can actually find precisely what happens is to see it firsthand. And bad guys don t come forward to the Congress and say here s what we re doing. So we had to go undercover
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 28, 1973. Testimony of John Dean.
Senator Howard Baker (R Tennessee). Now, let us see. The second heading, before I get to the second heading on page 1 of the second part of the exhibit, did I understand you to say that the penciled or penned capital "P" apparently with the checkmark through it is a White House designation that the document was seen or known of by the President? John Dean. That is correct. Senator Howard Baker (R Tennessee). Do you know this of your own knowledge? John Dean. Yes, I do.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 26, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean.
Samuel Dash, attorney. I want to ask you some questions, Mr. Dean about your handling of given to you by Mr. Richard Howard in the amount of $15,200 which you have included in your statement. To your knowledge this money came from the $350,000 sent to the White House before April 7, 72 from Sloan's safe, is that true? John Dean. That is true. I did not know at the time it was given to me but I later learned that was the source of the money.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 27, 1973
[00.51.14-DEAN identifies more documents about the ENEMIES LIST, concerning MUSKIE and McGOVERN campaign workers-it's amazing how matter of fact DEAN is in mentioning that there could possibly be an 'Enemies Project' in the White House] The next document I have is a list of the McGovern campaign staff. This list was prepared by Mr. Murray Chotiner and sent to me. Mr. Chotiner had some discussions with Mr. Ehrlichman about, this, and he was to prepare a list and send it over to me pursuant to some instructions and directions he had from Mr. Ehrlichman. Mr. DASH. Now, do you characterize that list as a so-called enemies list or a campaign contributors list? Mr. DEAN. This was to go into the general enemies project, which I might add at, this point generally went into the file, where it remained. The next document, dated November 5, 1971, is a memorandum from Gordon Strachan to me regarding J. Irwin Miller. It notes that "You will probably notice in this morning's news summary that J. Irwin Miller, who is still giving money to Democrat John Lindsay, though he states he will support, R.N., is also a backer of Lugar, I trust that you will use this information as you see fit in the enemies project,." Attached is the news summary of that day. The, next document I have starts "Politicos continued." This is a document that came out of Mr. Colson's office to me. Mr. DASH. What Is that ? Have you Identified that document? Mr. DEAN. Yes, I have. Mr. DASH. Is that also an enemies document Mr. DEAN. That is correct. That was a part--this is one of the, updates. I am sure there was a cover memorandum or probably it, is in my files somewhere In the White House that this was related to. The next document is dated November 11. It is a memorandum from a member of Mr. Colson's staff. The subject is -"Opponents' List," and it has, it is directed to Marge Acker, Pat Buchanan, John Dean, Dan Kingsley, Larry Higby, Gordon Strachan, Van Shumway, Gerry Warren, and Lucy Winchester. Connected to that is a similar list with more additional names, these all coming from Mr. Colson's office And there is a third document, dated June 2, of the, same nature. Mr. DASH. The same origin? Mr. DEAN. That is correct. There is a duplicate document of the same nature. Another one dated 'May 16. the same origin, as I say. this list was continually being updated, and the file, was several inches thick. [00.54.45-INSIGHT INTO THE SYSTEMATIC NATURE OF SINGLING OUT ENEMIES-narrowed down to a "top twenty"] The next document is a memorandum of September 14, 1971, from me to Mr. Higby, indicating a list of names that he had requested as 'Well as additional materials containing other names, I might as well read the memorandum: The list I have prepared Is merely suggestive; it is based on conversations I had with others regarding persons who have both the desire and capability of harming us. The list is limited to less than 20 persons, as it would be most difficult to proceed with more at this time. I would hope we would continue to feed additional names into the process every few months, but we must keep this project within reasonable bounds. I will await the review of these names as I feel certain there will probably be additions and deletions from the list. Before I take any action, please keep the list at least 20 or less. Attached is a list that was prepared based on a document that Mr. Colson had gone through and picked out some 20 key names. [00.56.01]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 25, 1973
[00.07.34-DEAN] FIRST DEALINGS WITH THE CIA I will turn now to the first dealings I had with the CIA It was during the meeting in Mitchell's office on June 23 or 24 that Mardian first raised the proposition that the CIA could, take care of this entire matter if they -wished, in that they had funds and covert procedures for distributing funds. I was personally unaware, of the workings of the CIA, but Mardian and Mitchell appeared very knowledgeable. [00.08.00] As a result of this conversation, which was prompted by my reporting that Gray thought the CIA might be involved, Mitchell suggested I explore with Ehrlichman and Haldeman having the White House contact the CIA for assistance. It was also argued that the individuals involved in the, Watergate incident 'as former CIA operatives, might compromise the CIA in some manner, and the CIA should be interested in assisting. On Monday morning June 26, 1 spoke with Ehrlichman regarding this suggestion, He thought it was a good idea and worth exploring. He told me to Call the CIA and explore it with them. I told him that I had never dealt with anyone, at the CIA. and did not know Director Helms. He told me that. I should not call Helms rather General Walters. I told him I did not know General Walters either. He then told me that he and Haldeman had had a little chat--as he called it-- with Helms and General Walters a few days earlier about their dealings with the FBI in relationship to the investigation. He was not specific. [00.09.10--taking care of business, EHRLICHMAN style] He then told me that I should deal with General Walters because he was a good friend of the White House and the White House had put him in the Deputy Director position so they could have some influence over the Agency. He told me that I should tell General Walters that I was, calling because he (Ehrlichman) had requested that I follow up on the earlier meeting they had and if there were any problems General Walters should call him. After my Meeting with Ehrlichman. I telephoned General Walters. I told him I was calling at Ehrlichman's request on a matter relating to his previous discussions, with Ehrlichman and Haldeman and would like. to have him visit with Me if possible. He seemed somewhat surprised and uncertain about my call, so I told him that he might like to check with Mr. Ehrlichman He said he would got back to me and he later called me back to set up a meeting for about noon at that day. When General Walters came to my office I told him again that I was meeting with him at Ehrlichman request. I made some general arguments about the Watergate case. It was from my discussion as a result of general comment with Walters that I became aware of that Ehrlichman and Haldeman had discussed the Dahlberg and Mexican money. We then discussed the fact that some of the, FBI were pursuing were, to my understanding, were unrelated to the Watergate but could result in persons, totally uninvolved being embarrassed. I would just like to note to counsel for the, record that that some, of this is different from the original; pagination of my draft that may have been lost through the transcribing of it here. I also told him that I understood that the FBI had developed three possible theories of the case. which I explained and then asked if, in fact, any of the men arrested were persons that were working for the CIA. [00.11.04] General Walters assured me that they were not, I then told him that I had been -asked to explore every possible means of dealing with this rather embarrassing and troublesome situation, because some of the men involved were looking for assistance. I asked if there any possible way the CIA could be of assistance in providing support for the individuals involved. General Walters told me, that while it could, of course. be done, he told me that. he knew the Director's feelings about such a matter and the Director would only do it on a direct order from the President. He then went on to say that to do anything to compound the situation would be most unwise and that to involve the CIA would only compound the problem because it would require that the President become directly involved. While I cannot recall in detail everything General Walters told me, I do recall that his argument was most sound and very persuasive, I told him I agreed with his position fully and I had merely been asked to explore the potential, which he, very rightly, stated was too great a risk. As the discussion ended I asked him that if he had any further ideas and told him I would appreciate the benefit of his thoughts I thanked him for his coming over and his candid answers and he, departed. [00.12.16-EHRLICHMAN asks DEAN to lean harder on the CIA to enter the coverup] subsequent to my meeting with General Walters. I reported back to Ehrlichman that, Walters had informed me that any involvement by the CIA in this matter was impossible. I recall that when I reported this to Ehrlichman, he. very cynically said "very interesting", he told me, that I should talk with General Walters further and push him a little harder to see if the CIA couldn't help out, particularly with regard to the unnecessary pursuit of investigative leads. I also recall Ehrlichman saying something to the effect that General Walters seems to have forgotten how he got -where he is today. [00.12.49]
CDF on Tax Cut Plan
Conservative Democratic Forum (CDF) members Charles Stenholm (D-TX), Kent Hance (D-TX), and Gillespie "Sonny" Montgomery (D-MS) stand behind U.S. House Representative Carroll Hubbard (D-KY) as he lets everyone know he was the sole group member to vote against the Gramm-Latta Bill. Hubbard also realizes the President is popular and has faced backlash in his district for his vote. He preferred the House Budget Committee proposal. People still believe that the economy can be turned around if the President's tax and budget proposals is passed. He is hopeful that can be true, proving his vote to against to be a mistake. However, Hubbard is fearful that budget and tax cuts proposed by the President will not deliver the economic miracle everyone is hoping for. He believes any bill should go before the House Ways and Means Committee and be compared with the President's plan to make sure its right for the American people, not just what benefits the President or Democratic Party.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, Testimony of James W McCord (Jim McCord)
Senator Sam Ervin (D North Carolina). I would like to state at this point that the testimony of Mr. McCord as to what was told to him by John Caulfield would not be accepted in a court of law to connect the President with what Mr. Caulfield was doing, but it is admissible to show whether or not Mr. Caulfield was a party to any agreement to connect the President for any information on what is known is the Watergate affair, but it is not evidence against the President at this stage. Senator Ed Gurney (R Florida). I think it ought to be pointed out at that time that at this time, January 1973, my understanding that Mr. Caulfield was not in the White House at all, but was employed, I think, by the Treasury Department. Samuel Dash, attorney. That is right. Senator Ed Gurney (R Florida). I hope we can correct these things as we go along. You are having all kinds of inferences here that are inaccurate and are casting aspersions that are going to damage peoples' characters. James McCord. I would be glad to serve my statement that political pressure was conveyed to me by Mr. Caulfield which he attributed to the White House which I'll recite in the memorandum sir.
Capitol Journal - Saudi Arabia Arms Sales
(01:00:00) WETA logo, PBS funding credits (01:00:13) Two unidentified congressmen give differing opinions about arms sales to Saudi Arabia - this footage is contained in window in the center of the screen, under this window runs a banner which reads Capitol Journal (01:00:27) From tv studio Capitol Journal host HODDING CARTER introduces show, Capitol Journal title screen and animation (01:00:47) In studio Carter gives background on show's topic - Congressional opposition to arms sales to Saudi Arabia, Representative MEL LEVINE of the House Foreign Affairs Committee speaking before the House says Saudi Arabia has not cooperated with the U.S., Representative GERALD SOLOMON speaking before the House says we should support "moderate" Arab states in the heated Middle East, long shot of the House recessing, on-screen text displays vote count on issue of Saudi arms sales from the House and Senate, President RONALD REAGAN at an economic summit in Tokyo says "Let them just wait until the old man gets home and see what happens to them" - this gets audience to laugh (unfortunately this clip has caption reading "Tokyo" and one reading "May 1986" both of which cross the bottom and tops of the screen), Senator RICHARD LUGAR - Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee - outside the White House surrounded by press gives Reagan's response to Congressional opposition to Saudi arms sales, Lugar reports that Reagan believes Saudi Arabia needs arms to combat Iran, Senator ALAN SIMPSON outside White House surrounded by press comments on sustaining Reagan's veto (01:03:07) On-screen text displayed over map of Middle East outlines U.S. objectives in the area, Middle East map then high-lighted to point out strategic importance of various countries (01:03:47) Carter standing outside the Capital Building segues to footage of Congressional debate on U.S. - Saudi Arabia policy, Representative Levine speaking before the House criticizes Saudi Arabia's foreign policy, Representative STUDDS criticizes foreign policy motivations of rejecting arms sales proposal (01:05:11) Clip displayed in window of NBC footage of Palestinian leader ABU ABAS (?) saying his organization plans to attack the U.S. from within, at meeting in Washington Isreali Secretary of Defense YITZHAK RABIN says that Saudi Arabia funds terrorists such as Abu Abas, Defense department footage of the various missiles to be sold to Saudi Arabia in action - a missile is fired from a jet fighter, a "harpoon" missile causes a tremendous explosion on a ship at sea, a series of shots of a man setting up, taking aim and firing a "stinger" surface to air rocket launcher - camera follows the stinger's rocket to its target - a jet plane which it blows up in midair (unfortunately until the stinger missile segment this military footage has the caption "Defense Department Footage" running on the top of the screen (01:06:46) Representative Levine on the House floor describes the Stinger missile as "a terrorist's delight" and warns against the sale of such things to Saudi Arabia, in interview with Carter RICHARD MURPHY Assistant Secretary of State defends the sale of weapons to Saudi Arabia, WILLIAM QUANDT of the Brookings Institution in interview with Carter comments on weapon sales to Saudi Arabia, Ambassador CLOVIS MAKSOUD of the League of Arab States clarifies the catch 22 Arab states fall under in their definition by the federal government (01:09:43) Carter back outside the Capital introduces other U.S. weapon sales to Saudi Arabia, Defense Department footage of AWACS radar plane, at meeting of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Senator ALAN CRANSTON establishes with witness that Syria is considered a terrorist threat, Senator Cranston in an office describes criteria which he outlined that Saudi Arabia must fulfill to be sold AWACS radar planes (01:11:32) Back in studio Carter segues to interviews conducted earlier with Representatives Levine and HENRY HYDE in a Congressional office - they discuss Saudi Arabia's status with U.S. - moderate or extreme, Saudi Arabia's role in the Middle East peace process, the threat of Iran, and the Presidential veto (01:19:04) Back in studio Carter introduces discussion panel: STEVE ROBERTS of the New York Times, EDWARD WALSH of the Washington Post, WILLIAM MAYNES - they talk about U.S. anti-Arab feeling, Jewish-American lobby, the White House administration's foreign policy intentions in selling arms to Saudi Arabia, and Israel in relation to U.S.-Saudi Arabia weapon sales (01:26:54) Carter thanks guests and closes out show (01:27:30) PBS funding credits
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 12, 1973
[00.12.39] Senator MONTOYA. Who did you ;how these receipts to before you destroyed them? Mr. PORTER. Mr. Reisner. Senator MONTOYA. Did you show these receipts to Mr. Magruder? Mr. PORTER. I don't, believe so. It is my understanding that, -Mr. Reisner relayed the information to Mr. Magruder, that is what he told me. Senator -MONTOYA. What was so sensitive with respect, to Watergate that, in your own discretion you destroyed them? Mr. PORTER. No, sir, I never said it was any relation to Watergate at, all, and I don't put anything in the category that I relate to you involving any of the payments that I made after April 7 to Watergate. Senator MONTOYA. just mention or suite, to me what sensitivity you find In those receipts that warranted their destruction. Mr. PORTER [conferring with counsel]. Yes, sir; as I say Mr. LaRue had come to in my office and had asked me to throw away anything that, could be in the category of being politically sensitive. -I would imagine I put in that category payments to Mr. Odle during the mining of the Haiphong Harbor and payment to Mr. Joanou which I later learned was for an ad in the -New York Times and I felt those were politically sensitive enough that I should not keep them. Senator MONTOYA. What others? Mr. PORTER. Well, sir, if I were going to throw away two or three I just took them all, again I had balanced with Mr. Reisner and had no need to keep them. It was strictly--- Senator MONTOYA. You must be able to recall other instances in the sensitivity which you placed on those receipts? Mr. PORTER. No, sir, I do not. As I have stated, I had balanced with Mr. Reisner I did not have tall accounting function at the committee. I had--the receipts were strictly internal documents. They were not meant for any public viewing at all and they were strictly internal and I had satisfied the internal requirement and I destroyed them. I throw them away. Senator MONTOYA. how many receipt would you say that you destroyed , can you estimate that, sir, Mr. PORTER. The second time, sir, after the Watergate break-in? Senator MONTOYA. Yes. Mr. PORTER. I would say approximately 10. Senator 'MONTOYA. And did you destroy other documents? Mr. PORTER. I had some. as -I say , travel schedules and old speeches and position papers and that sort of thing from some of the potential Candidates that I had been keeping that I throw away. Senator MONTOYA. what Were your exact duties at the CRP besides scheduling what other duties did you have? Mr. PORTER. Well, sir, as I said, in my--one of my earlier statements--, almost all of my time spent in the surrogate schedule, planning for the surrogate program which amounted to over a thousand man days of campaigning on the part of the surrogates, all their Schedules, talking with State chairmen and their appointed agents all over the country, working on airline schedules, Senator MONTOYA. Mr. Porter, I don't mean any duties pertaining to your scheduling and being out in the field, I say within the CRP in-house. What other duties did you perform? -Mr. PORTER. Other than those I have described sir, that--- Senator MONTOYA. In other words, you were the one, who would give instructions to Mr. Sloan for his disbursements of money? Mr. PORTER. I beg your pardon? senator MONTOYA. You were the one -who would give instructions to Mr. Sloan for the, disbursements of money or you would receive the money from Mr. Sloan and in turn give money to individuals such as Mr. Liddy? Mr. PORTER. That is right. I received my instructions from Magruder on the- who was to get certain funds and approximately how much, and I did go to Mr. Sloan, and I did get those funds and I did pass them on to various individuals. As I stated to Senator Baker, I believe on Thursday, of the some $60,000 that went through me from Sloan to others, that, in going back about 75 percent of that I did not know what the money was being used for at, the time. I served as a, I guess more or less a, bank teller really or a messenger to go down and pick it up. Senator MONTOYA. That is all, Mr. Chairman. Senator ERVIN. I have just one or two questions. Mr. PORTER. Yes sir. Senator ERVIN. Mr. Porter, you give the appearance of a, man who was brought up in a good home. Mr. PORTER. Thank you, sir. Senator ERVIN. And you were undoubtedly taught that it is an obligation of a citizen to testify truthfully when he is called on to testify under oath before a grand jury or a petit jury. Mr. PORTER. Yes, sir. Senator ERVIN. But you were persuaded not to do so with respect to the nonexistent conversation between you and Magruder in December 1971 by Magruder's insistence that, your loyalty to the President required you to go along with him on that proposition. Mr. PORTER. I would say that is basically correct. Senator ERVIN. Then later you applied for a position with the Government and did not receive it? Mr. PORTER. I would say a more accurate response to that is that I encountered quite a bit of difficulty in getting it and finally did receive an offer which I received on my own initiative. [00.18.10]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 14, 1973
[00.52.35] Senator BAKER. And you went back and on June, 19, you had a series of meetings with who--with Mr. Mitchell? Mr. MAGRUDER. Well, On June 19, On the Monday, I met, with Gordon Strachan, John Dean, Gordon Liddy, and Hugh Sloan, primarily. Senator BAKER. Did everyoue of those, people know what had occurred, how it occurred? Mr. MAGRUDER. Mr. Strachan did, Mr. Dean did. I do not know whether Mr. -Sloan did or not. He has indicated he. did not. I accept that at face value. Mr. Liddy, of course, did. Senator BAKER. When did you first begin planning the coverup? Mr. MAGRUDER. I think there was no question that the coverup began that, Saturday when we, realized there was a, break-in. I do not think there, was ever any discussion that there would not be, a coverup. At least,, I did not participate in any discussion that indicated anything else except at one point where we possibly thought that, I might volunteer to become the key figure in the case. Senator BAKER. An historic decision to go forward with this plan was followed with another historic decision to cover it up without any great debate or discussion of the matter. Mr. MAGRUDER. That is correct, sir. Now, I think to be, fair, Senator I think at that, point in time, -you have to realize that; One, I -felt, and I can't speak for the, others, that, the President had no knowledge of this plan and consequently, if he had been, if it had gotten out that people like Mr. Mitchell and others had been involved at that point in time, I honestly thought that his reelection would be probably negated. Now, at, that time--- Senator BAKER. Did it ever occur to you--- Mr. MAGRUDER. I knew it was wrong, but I thought it was the best decision to make. Senator BAUER. Did it ever occur to you at that time., and I am not saying this to impugn your character or testimony, but I really want to know, did it ever occur to you that there might be, other alternatives, that one of them might be to report this directly to the President or to the FBI and make a, clean breast of it. at that, moment, that that might have less effect on the election, rather than more effect--- [00.54.47] Mr. MAGRUDER. As I said, we did indicate at one point that we might possibly do that. up to a certain point. I think it was felt that it ever reached Mr. Mitchell before the election, the President would lose, the, election. Since he was not, involved to my knowledge, I thought that was the best decision, I did not think it was a right decision, but I thought it was the best, decision. [00.55.08--THIS IS A VERY TELLING MOMENT, MAGRUDER ANTICIPATES THE TONE OF THE QUESTION AND HINTS AT SOMETHING LARGER] Senator BAKER. Did You think that was a decision for the President to make? Mr. MAGRUDER. Sir, I can't comment as to whether he, did or did not or was involved in I had no dealings directly with the President. Senator BAKER. I am not asking you whether he did or not. that question had been and I am sure will be asked again and again of You and other witnesses. What I am asking you IS whether or not it occurred to you that a decision of that matter ought to be a Presidential decision. Mr. MAGRUDER. I assumed that the higher authorities in the campaign and at the White House would handle it in a way which they thought, was best for the President and I accepted that position Senator BAKER. Is it your testimony, Mr. Magruder---- Mr. MAGRUDER. Since it was also mine, Senator BAKER. Yes, IS it your testimony that, after June 17, in a series of meetings with Mr. Mardian, Mr. testimony Mitchell, and Mr. Dean, there, was never any doubt about your course of action, you were going to go into a coverup operation? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, Sir. Senator BAKER. Was there ever any consideration of presenting this material to the President for his information and knowledge and for his determination? Mr. MAGRUDER. Again. Senator, I -would not have been in a position to do that. It would have been people at the Other level, I do not know what occurred between 'Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman, and the President, There is no way I would have known that question, an answer to that question, sir. Senator BAKER. Thank you. Mr. Chairman. Senator ERVIN. Senator Inouye. Senator INOUYE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Magruder, in a political campaign, numerous decisions are made in a day's time, hundreds. Some are very Important, some unimportant Some involve major policy decisions, Would you consider intelligence gathering in the major policy category? Mr. MAGRUDER. At that time, I did not. I was personally more involved in what I call the technical operations of the committee, Again. Of the $50 million Mr. Stans has indicated we spent that campaign. most of my time was spent on what I would call the substance of the campaign --the direct mail. the advertising. The intelligence gathering was what it was called, I think Mr. Reisner used the term "throw-away." [00.57.51]