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Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities - Testimony of James McCord.
Senator Howard BAKER (R-TN). Now, just one or two more questions, I see the chairman looking at his watch over here and I don't want to run excessively long. I'll have other questions as the second round of inquiries starts, but let me try to close out this line of questioning this way. First, did you ever conduct electronic surveillance or clandestine activities against anyone other than the DNC, the Democratic National Committee at the Watergate complex, the McGovern headquarters which you've already described. Mr. James McCORD. No. Senator BAKER. Mr. Baldwin, I mean Mr. McCord please tell me whether or not you knew that this sort of activity was illegal. Mr. McCORD. I knew certain things that came to me, at the beginning of the operation and early in the operation, which indicated that it might be legal, may well be legal and I was so advised. Senator BAKER. By whom? Mr. McCORD. First of all, if I may explain ....coming through Mr. Liddy, and coming through my knowledge of the Attorney General, who was then Attorney General, and that was that the Attorney General first of all had the authority, on his own signature to approve wire-tapping within the United States for either national security reasons or for domestic security reasons. Senator BAKER. What was your motivation? Why did you do this? Mr. McCORD. There were several motivations, but the basic, one of the motivations was the fact that this man, the Attorney General had approved it in his offices over a series of meetings in which he had obviously given careful consideration to it, while he was a top legal officer of the United States government and that the council to the President had sat in with him during such discussions. The fact that we were, I was advised that it was within the attorney general's view and authority to authorize such operations, if it were in the national interest to do so. Senator BAKER. Did you believe that? Mr. McCORD. I believed that he had the authority to do it, I believed several things. Not only was I told certain things, pertaining to some matters I previously testified to, to this committee regarding Las Vegas and an incident there, but I was also aware that many things came over the attorney generals desk that I was not privy to, that Mr. Liddy was not privy to, but which the Attorney General was privy to, matters which might come to him through highly sensitive sources including wire tap information, which might provide a justification for such an operation, a justification beyond what was known to me. I can put in conversely as well ....I knew that, I felt that the attorney general, in his position as the top legal officer, if this operation were clearly illegal would turn it down out of hand, that he would have no trouble making a decision on the matter immediately. I knew from previous contact with him that he was a very decisive man, that he did not agonize over decisions and yet apparently he took this one under careful consideration and considered it for some thirty days in making a decision. And frankly, I had the, my conclusion was that he took it as well to higher authority and got a final approval from his superior before embarking upon this task, quite candidly and quite frankly this is exactly my motivation, my reason. A basic motivation of mine for being involved. Senator BAKER. This was your assumption, or your basis for judgment that the Attorney General must have done that? Do you have any evidence or any information that he did do that? Mr. McCORD. The evidence that the council to the President sat in with him ..... Senator BAKER. Very good. Mr. McCORD. ....on the meetings of this, and therefore that both the White House was represented and the Attorney General of the United States was represented in this decision, and that the thirty day delay to me, I drew the conclusion that the attorney general himself had conveyed the decision to his own superior, for a final decision. Senator BAKER. You spoke of a thirty day period in your earlier testimony, is this the same 30 day period? Mr. McCORD. It's a thirty day period ..... Senator BAKER. In your previous testimony you indicated, I thought you had said that you thought about this for 30 days before you did it, but I'm not sure that was the testimony. Is this the same thirty day period you're speaking of when you think the Attorney General looked into it, for thirty days before it was authorized? Mr. McCORD. Yes, that's correct sir. Senator BAKER. Alright, Mr. Chairman I have other questions, but I'll defer to my colleagues for the time being.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 25, 1973 - Statement of John Dean.
Meeting on March 17th. This was St. Patrick's Day and the President was in a very good mood and very relaxed and we engaged in a rambling conversation with only some brief reference to the Gray hearings and the problems that were then confronting the White House regarding the President's statements on executive privilege and his willingness to go to court on the matter. He opined that, he did not think that the Senate would be dumb enough to go for the bait he had given them but he was hopeful that they might.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 25, 1973 - Statement of John Dean.
After I departed the President's office, I subsequently went to a meeting with Haldeman and Ehrlichman to discuss the matter further. The sum and substance of that discussion was the way to handle this now was for Mitchell to step forward and if Mitchell were to step forward we might not be confronted with the activities of those involved in the White, House in the coverup. Accordingly, Haldeman, as I recall, called Mitchell and asked him to come down the next day for a meeting with the President on the Watergate matter.
Watergate Hearings - John Dean: Opening Statement
(06:50:54) Opens to testimony of JOHN DEAN, former Presidential Counsel, who is reviewing with Committee Vice Chairman HOWARD BAKER memorandum he issued about the Committee to Re-elect the President's counter-suits against the Democratic National Committee, the intent of these counter-suits was to combat Democratic probing of the Whitewater break-in, Dean reveals in his memorandum that these suits contained smear tactics (06:54:24) Skip in footage (06:54:55) Skip in footage - Dean tells of praise he received from Nixon for keeping the Watergate affair contained during the campaign of 1972 (06:56:58) Skip in footage, image returns in hyper-color - Dean's opening statement (06:57:33) Skip in footage - Dean: "The Watergate matter was the inevitable out growth of a climate of excessive concern over the political impact of demonstators, excessive concern over leaks, an insatiable appetite for political intelligence all coupled with a do it yourself White House staff, regardless of the law" (06:58:55) Dean talks about Nixon and the White House staff's obsession with political demonstrators and goes on to explain how that led to calls for investigation of demonstrators to gather incriminating dirt on them, at this time the White House was authorizing government agencies to use information reconnaissence tactics such as break-ins and phone bugging (07:03:38) Dean says that the White House received reports on demonstators and demonstrations from the FBI and CIA, he gives a detailed desciption of what groups and activities the reports would cover (07:06:00) Dean tells the committee how Nixon personally requested he keep him abreast about an Anti-Vietnam war demonstration on the Capital mall (07:06:40) Dean tells the committee a good story about how he first came to realize Nixon's obsession with demonstrators, the story is about Nixon's request for the removal of a lone protestor and his critical sign from Lafeyette Park, a location in view of the White House residence, during the telling of the story Dean unintentionally gets a guffaw from the audience when he says a White House staffer said he could rustle up some thugs to have the man removed, Committee Chairman SAMUEL ERVIN reprimands the audience for this (unfortunately the image is glitchy during this story) (07:08:20) Image very warbly here - Dean tells the committee another story to illustrate Nixon's inability to handle demonstrators, Dean says that once when staying in a Hotel in Akron Ohio Nixon called for demonstators across the way from the hotel to be removed - (Image comes back to normal) Dean goes on to say that Presidential advisor H.R. HALDEMAN gave the order that any means, legal or not, was to be used to keep demonstrators out of Nixon's sight (07:09:50) Dean says that Nixon pushed hard for further intelligence reports on demonstrators with hope of proving a contention he held that the demonstrations were the products of Democratic operations to defeat Nixon
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 29, 1973 (2/2)
[01.27.32-Sen. INOUYE continues to question DEAN about the degree of his involvement in spying and ENEMIES LIST projects in the White House-DEAN is a bit defensive] Senator INOUYE. How was this memo implemented? Could you give us examples, concrete examples? Mr. DEAN. The memo itself was never implemented. I never did have a political enemies project, that -was in any way operational. Senator INOUYE. However, we do have evidence, here that, for example a TV commentator with CBS was, in fact, audited by the Internal Revenue Service just for the purpose of harassment, isn't that Correct? Mr. DEAN. Well, I know Mr. Schorr had an FBI investigation. Senator INOUYE. Oh, it was an FBI? Mr. 'DEAN. Yes, it was. I know there were other instances. These did not come from me. Another instance, many times, members of the staff who were operating in the political area would want to see a tax return. My office, was supposed to be the office to have the facility to receive from Internal Revenue tax returns. I never called at any time I can ever remember while I was there to the Director of the Internal Revenue 'Service re requesting he send over a tax return on any individual to my office. Senator INOUYE. Have you ever seen tax returns Mr. DEAN. Have I other than my own? Senator INOUYE. Other than your own. Mr. DEAN. Only in connection with clearing individuals who voluntarily submitted them in relationship to a nomination for a Presidential appointment. Senator INOUYE. In your memo, you speak of granting availability, Federal contracts, et, cetera. I reefer you to exhibit No. 53. It is a memo for you from Gordon Strachan and it relates to Mr. Chet Huntley. It says here "John Whitaker has ordered the Department of Agriculture to quit dragging its heels on Big Sky," Was this a political favor? Mr. DEAN. What is the number of the exhibit,' Senator Senator INOUYE. I believe it is 53, sir. [01.29.47] Mr. DEAN. I recall the exhibit you are referring to, but it is not 53 in my sequence here. I believe that might be in 4, 5, 6, or 7. Well, anyway', I can answer the question. I recall there is a notation on it. [01.30.06-an example of the WHITE HOUSE'S tactics for "screwing our political enemies"] There -was at one point in time an effort, because of a comment--a rather hostile comment that Mr. Huntley had made regarding the President--there was an effort that I initially was unaware of to make it as difficult as possible for him to get his Big Sky project moving. Apparently, he needed assistance from the Department of the Interior. I would receive periodic calls asking me what is happening on that, and the like. I would, in turn, call John Whitaker, who is the person on the Domestic Council staff who had dealings with the Department of Interior. At one point in time, apparently, there was a change in heart on Chet Huntley and there was a turnaround, and Interior was given the signal that they should sign off on whatever it was he needed to get his Big Sky project accomplished. Now, I would have to review the document, that you are reefering to, and that may well answer your question. [01.31.12] Senator INOUYE. I believe this line of questioning IS very important, because your exhibits have listed, I would say, a couple of hundred names of very distinguished Americans most of them, and other exhibits have suggested that extra-legal activities had been carried out in connection with these names Now, there are Members of the Senate and Members of the House whose names have appeared, but, to date, you have been able to tell us of the possibility of a man from CBS, and Chet Huntley. @ [01.31.55]
Watergate Hearings, June 25, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean
Mr. Robert McCandless. It is also our understanding, and I hope it is correct, that any doctrines of executive privilege or attorney client privilege have already been taken care of by your committee. Mr. Samuel Dash, Chief Counsel. Yes. I think I would add to that Senator Howard Baker (R Tennessee). I would like to raise a, point in that respect and, in addition to the points raised by Mr. McCandless which I think is important to raise in protection of his client's rights. It is my understanding, and Mr. Dash the Chief Counsel for the Committee, can correct me if I am in error, it is my understanding last Monday there was transmitted to the witness with copies to the committee and its staff, a letter from Mr. Leonard Garment, the counsel for the White House or a counsel for the White House, indicating that the White House would not claim executive privilege as to this witness' testimony nor would it claim the privilege of attorney-client. And as I recall as well, that on matters of the use of documents nominally classified that they would leave to the discretion of the committee to decide how that should be handled. Mr. Samuel Dash, Chief Counsel. That is correct, Senator Baker. It initially was an oral statement given to me by Mr. Garment, Counsel for the President. He followed it up with a letter to Mr. Dean and a copy to our committee in which he put in writing that he was authorized by the, President to do as you just stated. Senator Howard Baker (R Tennessee). And the committee in executive session on this past Monday, I believe by unanimous vote, I am sure by unanimous vote, authorized the Chairman, to act on behalf of the committee in the matter of the handling of these classified matters. Thank you, sir. Senator Sam Ervin (D North Carolina). Certainly, let the record show as to what Mr. McCandless stated that any documents that the witness produces are produced in obedience to a subpoena duces tecum.
Lawmakers April 28 1983
Representative Clarence Long (D - Maryland), House Appropriations Committee, never before we ve often spent many millions of dollars on aid to all kinds of countries. Never before we ever got anything for the money. This time we re getting a little something. We re getting some concessions from the administration.
Lawmakers October 20 1983
Paul Duke, Linda Wertheimer and Cokie Roberts. Topics on program: House Democrats vote to cut off funding to Nicaraguan Contras, Senate approves Martin Luther King Day as national holiday, the loss of two members of a Senate committee could hurt the Pentagon, and influence of Presidential election on Congressional actions.
Congress: We The People 8/23/1983
Congressional Committee Hearing Representative John Seiberling (D Ohio ) The rules of the House are that members should be entitled to not less than 5 minutes and the Chair can recognize them for more and usually does. Representative Don Young (R Alaska) You and I have worked together for a long time
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 14, 1973
[00.02.00--in to Jeb MAGRUDER testifying] Mr. MAGRUDER.....without his prior approval, which in a sense was a negative approval. We, let Mr. Strachan know that we, were contemplating hiring Mr. Liddy through Mr. Dean. There were some salary discrepancies and discussions with another assistant of Mr. Haldeman's When that was straightened out, in fact, that led to a memo which I sent to Mr. Haldeman explaining all the individuals who had been hired from the, White House, at, -what salary, and so on. Mr. Liddy is included in that memo. Mr. DASH. So Mr. Haldeman was involved in solving the salary setup? Mr. MAGRUDER. That is correct; yes. Mr. DASH. Now, when -Mr. Liddy told Mr. Mitchell and you after you had gone over the Gemstone file with him. and when Mr. Mitchell said he was dissatisfied. and he said that he was going to correct the errors, did Mr. Mitchell or you say no; don't do it? Mr. MAGRUDER. No. Mr. DASH. Isn't it true, also, Mr. Magruder, THAT you did give Mr. Howard some information that you had received, information from that operation? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes: in a number of informal discussions with him. I indicated that, we would have information forthcoming and that If he could work with Mr. Strachan who was the conduit, we Would probably be able to provide them. Mr. Colson headed up the group called the--- Mr. DASH. This was Gemstone you were referring to ? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes: I was referring to Gemstone, but to be fair. to Mr. Howard, I didn't say this was Gemstone information coming from wiretaps, Mr. DASH. Now. did you have any discussion -with Sally Harmony prior to her testimony? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes. Mr. DASH. 'Could you give us briefly what that, discussion was? Mr. MAGRUDER. It was the type of discussion we had with a number Of employees who were being questioned by the U.S. attorney's office: generally speaking, that we hoped they would do nothing that would affect the President's election type of discussion Other people did discuss With others, Miss Harmony and other people, more detailed facts about this. Mr. DASH. What did she say to you when you said that? Mr. MAGRUDER. She indicated that there would be, no problem with her testimony. Mr. DASH. Did you make that report to Mr. Mitchell? Mr. MAGRUDER. Again, I think there were other individuals who were more directly involved with talking with people who were Prospective witnesses I think I probably did mention when we found out that we were not going to have a problem. Mr. DASH. Did Mr. LaRue toll you what his role was in the coverup? I think you mentioned him by name? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes; he worked, of course, on the funds end of it. Mr. DASH. Did he say what I told you? Mr. MAGRUDER. He simply told me, that he was parceling out the cash, in effect. Mr. DASH. Can YOU be more specific? Mr. MAGRUDER. I really can't, because the, only direct reference was, did I know somebody who could make a drop for him to one of the defendants in Miami. So -he didn't go Into detail as to how he was doing it, so it would be, very difficult for me to be more specific. Mr. DASH. Did he tell you where he was getting the money? Mr. MAGRUDER. I think there, was, some reference to the, $350,000 made. Mr. DASH. What $350,000? Mr. MAGRUDER. That was transferred over to Mr. Haldeman and", Mr. Strachan and then transferred back. Mr. DASH. Is that the $350,000 that appears there, that was taken from Mr. Sloan's safe? Mr. MAGRUDER. As a matter of fact, Mr. LaRue did tell me when Mr. Strachan brought that back, Mr. Strachan wanted a receipt. Mr. LaRue said "I won't give you a receipt." so Mr. Strachan just. gave him the money. Mr. DASH. That is when Mr. Strachan brought it back from the White, House? Mr. MAGRUDER. To Mr. LaRue. Mr. DASH. You said when the, question of the, coverup -was about to be developed, you were ready yourself to take the blame--actually, to resign. Mr. MAGRUDER, I had suggested it hopefully was a. secondary alternative. Mr. DASH. But you said it wasn't picked up. Who didn't pick it up? Mr. MAGRUDER. I think it was picked up for a period -of time and I think there was serious discussion. Mr. DASH. Who decided not to? Mr. MAGRUDER. Mr. Mitchell told me they did not accept my offer. Mr. DASH. Isn't it, true that Mr. Haldeman told YOU that the President wanted you to stay on? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes; that, is correct. Mr. Haldeman told -me when Mr. MacGregor became campaign director, he wanted me to stay as deputy campaign director. Mr. DASH. That was after Mr. Mitchell was to leave? Mr. MAGRUDER. That is correct,. [00.06.23] Mr. DASH. Is it true that there -was so-me discussion In the earlier meeting, especially after the February 4 meeting in Mr. Mitchell's office, that there had to be some deniability for Mr. Mitchell? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, Mr. Dean brought that subject up Mr. DASH, Can you tell us how he brought that subject up? Mr. MAGRUDER. "Toward. the end of the meeting--again we were getting into these very sensitive, matters and I think Mr. Dean said it would be appropriate in the future that we not hold meetings with Mr. Mitchell in his office, but that Gordon and you and I, meaning myself, matters came up and that I become a, conduit to Mr. Mitchell, so Mr. Liddy would not have to deal with Mr. Mitchell directly. Mr. DASH. When Mr. Dean was appearing at these meetings and was working with you later on the break-in, Was It, your impression that he was acting alone or in his capacity as a White House assistant? Mr. MAGRUDER. He was working with Mr. Mitchell, so in effect, he was helping Mr. Mitchell, Again, it is an unfair assumption for me to make as to whether he was or wasn't working under direct orders of Mr. Haldeman or Mr. Ehrlichman. I do not know. [00.07.29]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 25, 1973
[00.07.25-DEAN discusses working to cover up the activities of Donald SEGRETTI, who performed political "dirty tricks" for the White House] When Segretti came to my office the next morning. he told me of his relationship with Mr. Hunt and that he had only had incidental dealings with him and recalled meeting a with him twice in Florida and several subsequent telephone calls. Segretti told me that Hunt had "scared him' and that he had really decided early on to deal with him as little as possible. Segretti then described how he had been hired and the fact that he had met with Kalmbach to arrange his compensation. He said he wanted to know whether he should mention the fact that Strachan. and Chapin had recruited him and Kalmbach was paying him when He was interviewed by the FBI. [00.08.07] I told Segretti that he should answer any and all questions asked about Hunt and his relationship with Hunt but that he should withhold the names of Strachan, Chapin, and Kalmbach unless the FBI felt it was absolutely necessary to have the names. Segretti departed and returned to California. Several days after Segretti' FBI interview he called me and told me that he thought his interview had gone very well. He said he told the., FBI everything He knew about Mr. Hunt and the fact that he had no knowledge of the Watergate incident and that the agents had not pressed him in a manner that required him to reveal the names of Strachan, Chapin and Kalmbach. I thanked him for informing me, of the results of his interview and did not hear again from him until much later. [00.08.55] The next time I heard from Segretti was in August, during the Republican National Convention In Miami. I received a call from Mr. Chapin who indicated that Segretti was concerned about the fact that he being called before a Federal grand jury in Washington to investigate the Watergate. Chapin told me that Segretti was looking for guidance as to his appearance before the grand jury and that he was concerned that he might have to reveal the names of Strachan, Chapin, and Kalmbach. I informed Chapin that it Would be impossible for me to go to Washington to see Segretti, but if he wished to come to Florida prior to his scheduled grand jury appearance. I would be happy to meet with him. [00.09.30-again, Henry PETERSEN is called on to fix a White House concern with the justice Department] After my conversation with Chapin, I called Mr. Peterson at the Department of Justice and explained the problem that was confronting Segretti. I told Petersen that to the of my knowledge Segretti had no involvement in the Watergate incident but he had had dealings with Hunt in connection with some campaign activities he had been performing for the White House. I also informed Petersen that he was being paid by the President's personal attorney, Mr. Kalmbach, and that he had been recruited by Chapin and Strachan. I said. that these facts, if revealed, would obviously be. quite embarrassing and could cause political problems during the waning weeks of the election. Mr. Petersen said that he understood the problem and would determine what he could do. I subsequently talked to Petersen again and be told me that he did not believe it would be necessary for the prosecutors to get into these areas when Mr. Segretti appeared before the grand jury. Segretti came to Florida a day or so before his appearance before, the, grand jury. To the best of my recollection it was on a Saturday, during the week I was in Miami preparing for the convention. I had a very brief meeting with Segretti not longer than 30 minutes, as I recall in which -we reviewed his potential problem. I told him that I did not believe that the, Government was particularly interested in pursuing the names of Strachan, Chapin, and Kalmbach in connection with his activities and I doubted if he would be asked any questions about these areas. I told him, however, if he, were asked the questions, that he should answer any question and every question truthfully, and if he were asked the names of who had hired him and who had paid him that he should give the names. I told him if pressed, he, should lay out the whole ball of wax. I later learned from Segretti that the names had come out during the grand jury appearance and I had a discussion later with Petersen, also on the subject in which he told me that Mr. Silbert had tried to avoid getting into this area and in fact did not ask him the question which resulted in his giving the names, rather that a grand juror had asked the question despite the fact that the prosecutors had tried to gloss over it. [00.11.40-the COVERUP widens, more holes to plug, H.R. HALDEMAN is in jeopardy of being revealed in complicity with WATERGATE] As a result of Segretti's appearance before the grand jury, FBI` interviews were scheduled for Chapin, Strachan, and Kalmbach. I had, by this time. learned the full story, that in fact Haldeman, in a meeting with Kalmbach, had approved Segretti's activities and authorized Kalmbach to make the. payments to Segretti, In discussing this Chapin and Strachan before their appearances or their FBI interviews, I should say, they both had great concern about revealing Haldeman's involvement. -In fact, I recall that Strachan came into my office when Dick Moor was present, and said that he would, if necessary, perjure himself to prevent involving Haldeman in this matter. I told Strachan that that was certainly not necessary in my estimation, but he was indeed, most loyal to Haldeman for taking that position. Dick Moore made a similar comment. When the agents came to interview -Chapin and Strachan, they contained themselves in their questioning and, to the best of my knowledge, all the answers that Chapin and Strachan provided were truthful though I must say that, pursuant to discussions I had had with them before their interview, they did not volunteer any information that was not asked for. [00.12.52]
NPACT coverage of Church Committee Hearings - The mystery of the shell fish toxi
Senator WALTER HUDDLESTON of Kentucky asks Schantz if there was a formal procedure for acquiring the toxin - Schantz replies that within the army it was passed back and forth and that toxin traveling outside had to be approved by head quarters after background checks of the recipients were run (00:17:23) Huddleston asks how many shell fish are involved in making one gram of toxin and how they were secured - Schantz responds that it would take several thousand shell fish and that he and people at the University of California Medical School in San Francisco would harvest them at the appropriate time (00:19:05) Senator WALTER MONDALE of Minnesota asks if Schantz assumed the presidential order to destroy toxins applied as well to the shell fish - Schantz responds yes (00:20:55) Footage returns to tv studio with Jim Lehrer who sets up the testimony of the day's second witness Charles Senseney who also worked at Fort Deitrich Biological and Chemical Warfare Center in Maryland - Lehrer explains that Senseney is a hard ware designer and not a toxin handler. Back to the Senate hearing room where Mondale is asking Senseney if he participated in conversations about the CIA's removal of the the poison - Senseney says yes, CIA wanted back the shell fish toxin, Dr. COLLIN came to lab to get back toxin (00:23:03) Smothers asks if Senseney about a dart launcher he developed and how it was tested - Senseney gives details explaining it was designed to be tested on dogs (00:25:07) Lehrer's voice comes over testimony and tells audience that later in hearing Senseney describes other devices he designed to deliver the poison to a person (00:26:35)
NPACT coverage of Church Committee Hearings - The mystery of the shell fish toxi
Senator HOWARD BAKER asks Senseney to describe his devices - Senseney talks about an aersol delivery system for roads and railroad tracks, a fountain pen that fires darts, a light switch aerosol operation, a walking cane, an umbrella, a straight pen that was used by a Mr. POWERS on his U2 mission, buttons that hold poisons - there is some joking exchanges within these descriptions between the witness and Baker - when asked about poisoning cigars Senseney responds it would be too easy for him (00:26:45) Baker wants to know if any of these devices were made for or delivered to inteligence agencies - Senseney responds that they were merely shown the possibilites in sort of a sales show - which he adds even members of congress were present at (00:30:06) Senator GARY HART asks if Senseney is familiar with the vulnerabilitiy studies one of which was conducted at the FDA building - Senseney responds that yes he designed a drill for this study that penetrated a water pipe and put dye in the water system (00:31:00) Hart asks if Senseney is familiar with vulnerability study conducted on the New York subway - Senseney responds that yes he participated in it riding the subway and sampling the air - a colleague of his meanwhile had dropped a light bulb from a car that was filled with a mock toxin - it spread rapidly through all the tunnels and Senseney measured its intensity - Hart asks if the test was made known to the city or passengers - Senseney responds no (00:32:23)
NPACT coverage of Church Committee Hearings - The mystery of the shell fish toxi
Hart wants to know who requested the tests and if there have been others - Senseney responds that he does not know more than that there is a department which specializes in such tests at Fort Deitrich, he then lists where other tests were conducted. The picture returns to the studio where Nicholas Horac is interviewed by Lehrer and Duke about his perceptions thus far of the investigation - Horac says he wants more details on how much these toxins have been used in U.S. operations abroad (00:34:45) Lehrer introduces the day's final witness Robert Andrews (00:37:39) Back at the hearing room Church asks how inventory records at Deitrich do not account for the 11 grams of shell fish toxin - Andrews responds it was a question of dates (00:38:04) Huddleston asks about the Army accepting a false name in its release of the toxins (00:41:00) Picture returns to the studio and Jim Lehrer who tells the audince the P-600 mystery has been resolved (00:41:49) Back to an earlier day of the trial when Mondale discovers mystery upon asking who P-600 is of CIA director William Colby - P-600 is written on the cans of toxin as who should be referred to about their use (00:42:18) Now footage is shown of today's court precedings and after getting a sketchy answer out of Dr. Schantz, Robert Andrews finally comes forth with the real answer that P-600 is an account number for Fort Deitrich (00:43:34) Back again to the studio and Paul Duke who further interviews Horac about the investigation so far, all men agree the investigation is only digging so deep, they mention that congress is to formulate legislation to deal with all illegal operations everywhere but that the general popular sentiment towards these hearings is that their reforming power is limited (00:46:26)
JFK Assassination HSCA Hearings
House Select Committee on Assassinations hearing on the assassination of U.S. President John F. Kennedy, Professor Mark Weiss discussing the scientific and mathematical processes for identifying exact echo locations of gunfire in Dealey Plaza, based on data from the acoustic analysis. Using two pins and a length of string, Weiss plots out the direction of gunfire sounds and echo points on a map of Dealey Plaza. Weiss identifies the Dallas County Records Building as one echo surface.
More Opening Day 98th Congress, 1983
Opening Day 98th Congress, U.S. House Representative and Majority Leader Jim Wright (D-TX) continues enumerating proposed rule changes up for debate for 98th Congress: 3. Clarification that membership to a committee in the House is contingent on membership in a party Caucus or Conference. 4. Applicable only to the Committees and Subcommittees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Intelligences, the rule would allow for meetings to be "closed" for the current day and five additional days.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 13, 1973 (2/2)
****SEE RESTRICTIONS FIELD OF RIGHTS SECTION***** [01.13.41] [shot of AUSTEN and ALEXANDER, guest commentators] LEHRER introduces guests. Asks ALEXANDER if there is an inherent evil in the use of CASH in a political campaign. ALEXANDER states that STANS stated there is a need for petty cash, and that sometimes small sums of cash are raised, like a collection at a rally, and there should be no restriction on small sums of cash. In terms of legislation, he would not favor a ban on cash, but circumscribing it with a limit of $50 to $100 or other amount set by Congress, and regulations on the use of cash within organizations. I.E., an advance man might need $200 cash, but he would want to limit it as much as possible. LEHRER states that STANS had just testified about some advantages of anonymity for a contributor, but he did not discuss why a contributor might prefer to give CASH. Asks what such advantages might be. ALEXANDER states that cash is a universal exchange, and it is not linked directly to its source, LEHRER asks AUSTERN about KALMBACH'S request of STANS for cash on authority of unnamed "high sources" in the White House. Asks if it is later determined that the $75,000 was used for illegal reasons, is STANS legally culpable, even though he did not know and KALMBACH refused to tell him the purpose of the money. AUSTEN says that in the criminal law, STANS is not responsible if he was ignorant of the purpose of the money, but adds that a number of civil suits have been lodged in the Watergate matter, including one by the Democratic Committee against CRP defendants. In this case, the issue is not intent, but negligence--Not what STANS knew, but what he should have known and failed to inquire about. The proof in a civil matter is very different, and as a civil defendant he could be liable. LEHRER asks about the AUSTEN's rating of Sen. ERVIN as a country lawyer, notwithstanding his squabble with Sen. GURNEY. AUSTEN says that he would like "to be a country lawyer like he's a country lawyer", that ERVIN obviously has a superior legal mind, and plows right ahead in questioning, which is vital with a witness like STANS, who does not answer "yes or no", but gives lenthy answers. Says that ERVIN asks his questions without getting sidetracked by the long answers of STANS. LEHRER states that VP AGNEW has caught some spillover from Watergate, as a Maryland grand jury has delivered a four-count indictment against parties involved in the Baltimore fundraising dinner mentioned by STANS. The identity of persons indicted will not be known until arrests are made, likely tomorrow. [01.19.27--MacNEILL] MacNEILL states there are two themes in the hearings, with the first being finding out who did the dirty deeds of the 1972 campaign, who is guilty and how high the guilt reaches. Theme two, getting a great deal of play today, was finding out the ins and outs of campaign financing, the morality of campaigning, in order to draft better campaign legislation, with Sen. ERVIN and Sen. BAKER forcing many witnesses to publicly search their consciences. States that this may help to shed light and attention, by example, on the role of morality in political campaigning. Says that two principles have emerged, first that loyalty, to President or Party, is not an excuse to abandon one's own judgment. second, that the conduct of people in high positions of power, should be guided by principles higher than the bare legal minimum. Signs off. [title screen--:SENATE HEARINGS ON CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES"--Sponsor credits--NPACT ID--PBS Network ID] [01.21.40--TAPE OUT]
Watergate Hearings, June 25, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean
John Dean. In addition to the rather wide ranging types of inquiries evidenced by the documents I have just referred to, and in addition to the extensive efforts to obtain politically embarrassing information on Senator Kennedy, there were also frequent efforts to obtain In politically embarrassing information on Mr. Lawrence O'Brien the Democratic National Committee Chairman, Senator Muskie, and Senator McGovern. While the involvement of my office in seeking such information was peripheral, I have submitted to the committee, exhibits no. 6, 7, and 8, records and documents which show the efforts of the White House to politically embarrass those individuals. Again, because of the very sensitive, nature of information contained in these documents and the problems that information might unfairly cause those individuals, I shall not discuss the documents further other than to point out to the committee that the interest in Mr. Larry O'Brien dates back, from my records, to the time, I first joined the White House staff in July 1970. While the interest in Senators Muskie and McGovern developed as the reelection campaign developed.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 28, 1973 (1/2)
[00.40.46] Senator BAKER. The committee will come to order. It is my information from the, floor of the Senate, that there will be a series of other votes tonight. The Senate will be in session probably until 9 or 10 o'clock. That is for the edification of my colleagues. At the time -we ended, Mr. Dean, I believe you were about to tell us about the February meeting. Mr. DEAN. Yes, sir; Senator, you asked me, to give you -what led up to a given set of meetings and we had turned to the immediate agenda, but I think we ought to be. complete and full in answering the -way you requested I answer. I will give you the, intervening sequences that occurred just in highlight again, directly relating to what occurred in the February meetings. It was the intervening event of the payment of silence, money and then the lack of that money and a serious problem with differences between Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman about who would raise that money. [00.41.48] There, was also the intervening event of clemency being assured to Mr. Hunt, in which Mr. Ehrlichman informed me that--I was present when he, told Mr. Colson and myself that, he was going in to see the President about it. He subsequently informed me he, talked to the President. MR. Colson had informed me he talked to the President about it and subsequently, there was another meeting in Mr. Ehrlichman's office when it was described how the assurance was given to Mr. Hunt's lawyer, Mr. Bittman. Senator BAKER. Before you go on with that, Mr. Dean, so you have some preview of the subject matter I am going to cover, it would appear now that I probably may not finish my questions in this first round, but just so you know I do not intend to skip those things, I have, on my list the break-in, the, coverup, the so-called enemies list, executive privilege, Executive clemency domestic intelligence, Internal Revenue Service, Judge Richey, and a number of other things. Each of those I consider to be a subject I want to explore more fully. But for the sake of time---- Mr. DEAN. All I am doing is highlighting, as I just did right then, what was leading up to the February, meetings. [00.43.04] Senator BAKER. All right, but for the sake of time, I would like to focus at this moment on what the President knew and when he knew it. Let us start first, with direct information that you have. Mr. DEAN. All right. I am going to give you a, document that, went directly to the President and I think that the fastest way for me to handle that is just to read the document. We have already covered the first part of it. Senator BAKER. What document? [00.43.24-DEAN shows a document that details BAKER'S secret meeting with NIXON] Mr. DEAN. This is exhibit No. 34-34. The first part was what we just discussed, "Baker meeting with President. "Baker requested secret meeting re Watergate hearings. "Baker told Timmons he, wants guidance, but to maintain his purity in the Senate he doesn't want a anyone to know of meeting with the, President. "Timmons believes that Baker wants to help. "Timmons does not feel Baker would object if there was staff present during meeting, so long as fact of meeting never gets out. "Meeting would be excellent chalice to find out what Baker plans to do and set up channel to work with him." This was based on a conversation, as I believe we discussed in executive session, of Mr. Timmons' perception of the conversation he had with you. "(2) Sending Stans up for confirmation. "We don't know if Stans wants to do this, but we do know he -wants to be rehabilitated and isn't afraid to tell his story publicly. "Confirmation hearings would help defuse Watergate hearings, and the more of this we get to the public, the less impact the Watergate hearings per se will have. "This should be resolved quickly, because it will only be helpful if it, occurs prior to Watergate hearings. (Stans has requested to see Dean on February 28--upon his return from Jamaica.) "(3) What to do with Magruder: "Jeb wants to return to the White House (Bicentennial project). "May be vulnerable (Sloan) until Senate hearings are completed. "Jeb personally is prepared to withstand confirmation hearings. [00.45.01-DEAN discusses proposed role of Pat BUCHANAN] "(4) Use of Buchanan as observer/spokesman to keep press coverage honest: "Watergate press coverage to date has been dishonest and libelous. Pat could call them to task. "The hearings are going to be partisan. Pat, could make certain that the public understand this. "Teddy Kennedy is a, moving force behind the hearings--this can and should be, documented. Pat could do this well. "The public does not perceive Buchanan as being that close to the President. The basic question is whether the White House. is going to sit quietly and take the unwarranted abuse, that is bound to come from hearings.' We can't run a secret counter PR effort so why not, do it Openly and respectfully--Pat can do that." "Buchanan's role will eliminate much of the heat that Ziegler will otherwise receive, and Ziegler could even have Pat brief from time to time. [00.45.55]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 14, 1973
[00.53.59] Senator ERVIN. Let me. read those questions and answers to you. [quoting transcript] Yes, On June 24 were you in a meeting with Mitchell and Stans? Mr. MAGRUDER. yes, Question. what was that meeting about? Mr. MAGRUDER. About what happened. Question. Is that when Mr. Stans asked you about that? Mr. MAGRUDER. Well, he did not ask me. He asked Mr. Mitchell what had happened. Question. That's when they made you a quote., Mr., Mitchell did. Did you tell Mr. Stans what happened? Mr. MAGRUDER. Mr. Mitchell told. Question. What did he, say? Mr. MAGRUDER. That we had had this operation and ended up with Mr.--- And then there, is a dash indicating interruption Question. Mr. Mitchell in fact did on June 24 make that statement to Mr. Stans? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes. Question. Did you corroborate that statement at that time? Did you make any statements? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes. I was a participant but primarily between the, two principals. Question. Did a discussion come out with Mr. Stans that is where your money went? Mr., MAGRUDER. In effect, what was going on. Question,. What happened with our money? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes. Question. Actually, he was sitting on top of the money. Mr. MAGRUDER. At that point, he was sitting on the bottom. Question. Did he say anything? What did Stans say at that point? Mr. MAGRUDER. I think he was satisfied that he knew what had happened. He, therefore then was able to go back I guess and try to determine how to handle the problem through the money It was Mainly in relation to Mr. Sloan as to how we were handling--they would handle Mr. Sloan. [end quoted section] Senator ERVIN. Is that a substantially correct transcript? Mr., MAGRUDER. Yes, I think that fits. Senator, with just what I have said, that, Mr. Sloan was not forthcoming with us about how much money had been disbursed to Mr. Liddy and we were, interested to know what the dollars, were and he said he could not tell us and we went, through this scenario into July, Senator. Senator ERVIN. But this transcript of your testimony says that Mr. Mitchell told Mr. Stans and that this is what Mr. Mitchell said, "That, we had this operation." Mr. MAGRUDER. That is correct. I think 1 just repeated that before, Senator ERVIN. Who were the "we"? Mr. MAGRUDER. "We" was us, I think I just said. Senator ERVIN. And the operation they were talking about was the Watergate burglary. Mr. MAGRUDER. That is correct Senator ERVIN. Yes. And Mr. Mitchell told Mr. Stans that that was where his money had gone Mr. MAGRUDER. That is correct. Senator ERVIN. In this operation -which we--that is, Mr. Mitchell and you--had this? Mr. MAGRUDER. That is correct But in fairness to -Mr. Stans, Mr. Mitchell and I did not say we led this operation. We said it was one of Our operations which had been fouled up, In effect. Senator ERVIN. But you said it Was your operation? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, Senator ERVIN. And the operation you were talking about was the burglary at the Watergate? Mr. MAGRUDER. That is correct. Senator ERVIN. Senator Weicker. Senator WEICKER. Mr. Magruder. just ONE very brief question. Did John Dean prepare you for your grand jury testimony on August 16? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes. Senator WEICKER. Before the grand jury? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes. Senator WEICKER. When did that preparation take place? Mr. MAGRUDER. We had discussed it over the weeks 1 had worked with the attorneys and I worked with Mr. Mitchell but we had spent, hours on the morning before I had the formalization with the prosecutors where he interrogated me. Senator WEICKER. He interrogated you in other words what-- Mr. MAGRUDER. In the same nature he expected them to interrogate me. Senator WEICKER. Sort of a mock trial, with Mr. Dean as prosecutor? Mr. MAGRUDER. That is correct. Senator WEICKER. Where did this take, place? Mr. MAGRUDER At his office. in the White House. Senator WIECKER. In the White House? Mr. MAGRUDER. That is correct. [00.58.16]
Iran-Contra Hearings - Testimony of Colonel Oliver North.
Representative Lee Hamilton (D - Indiana). Proceeding under the 15 minute rule now the Chair recognizes the Chairman of the House Select Committee, Mr. Fascell. Representative Dante Fascell (D - Florida). Thank you Mr. Chairman. Colonel North, I wish it was under different circumstances that I saw you again. It been about bow 6 months or more since you first appeared before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives and stated at that time that no one wanted to tell the story more than you did. And we gave you the opportunity then, to take advantage of your Constitutional rights, which you have every right to do, and in my judgment you should have done. Now the Congress has provided you this opportunity in the last several days and your testimony has been remarkable.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 14, 1973 - Testimony of Jeb Magruder
[00.02.00--NPACT letters on black screen--image of page bearing Senate Resolution 60, Robert MacNEILL v.o. reads text of resolution--title screen "SENATE HEARINGS ON CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES"] ****SEE RESTRICTIONS FIELD OF RIGHTS SECTION***** [00.02.48--MacNEILL in studio] MacNEILL states that the days hearings will be one of the most incredible events in memory, as the No. 2 man in the Nixon campaign, Jeb MAGRUDER, makes "an almost complete confession" to planning and covering up the Watergate affair, and implicating John MITCHELL in the planning and the coverup, among others. States that after months of allegations and rumor, tonight, a central figure lays out the evidence in such a way that it will take "extraordinary agility" for the principals named to "wriggle out of his accusations" [00.03.43--Jim LEHRER] LEHRER states that MAGRUDER decided to talk for two reasons, first that the COVERUP story was losing credibility, and second, he was offered immunity by the prosecution, in a deal that leaves him vulverable only to one charge. Introduces guest commentators, John Kramer of Georgetown University Law school KRAMER states that wherever white collar crime is concerned, immunity deals for the testimony of a conspirator are about the only way to make a case. However, it's a funny kind of deal in that it's not binding, and you could even say that the deal can't even be mentioned in court when MAGRUDER cops a plea to the lesser charge. States that MAGRUDER's testimony can ever be used against himself in court, even if his plea deal falls through, under the terms of a "use-immunity" deal. [00.05.22--LEHRER] LEHRER states that KRAMER will return at the end of the day to comment more. States that the Committee was curious about motivation as well as about the ins and outs of the coverup MAGRUDER'S testimony indicated a "climate" in the White House of fear of demonstrators, and a feeling that if NIXON Administration foes routinely broke the law (by draft dodging, civil disobedience, etc), it was justified for NIXON's aides to break it as well. [00.06.02--MAGRUDER testifying] MAGRUDER discusses how the "lawlessness" of the Anti-Nixon forces seemed to justify the activities of the Pro-Nixon side. Concedes that it is true that "two wrongs don't make a right", and that he has had to deal with the consequences of his decisions, but at the time, in that climate, such actions seemed appropriate. [00.07.00--MacNEILL in studio]
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 26, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean.
Fred Thompson, attorney. You mentioned also Mr. Ziegler, and of course, we all know the statements that he continually made concerning this matter. Who was supplying Mr. Ziegler his information? John Dean. I would say that basically, I supplied a large amount of it. I think that Mr. Ziegler would check many times with Mr. Ehrlichman, sometimes with Mr. Haldeman, and often with the President himself, he would check out a given statement. At times, I was called, as I say often, not on a daily basis, by any means, but with some frequency, that was how Ziegler could sort of wade through a story being factual, but without actually going out and lying on a given matter. How he could hedge and bob and weave. I think that the exhibit that I submitted is very typical of the type of approach that he would take. He would take, you know, an offensive approach rather than to really admit a given set of facts. Because he couldn t, you know I d tell him he couldn t admit the facts. Fred Thompson, attorney. Did Mr. Ziegler know the truth? John Dean. No, he did not. In fact that was a very difficult situation. Mr. Ziegler, on countless occasions, asked me to brief him. I on several occasions asked Mr. Ehrlichman if I could brief Ziegler. I was given very specific instructions that I was not to brief Ziegler. In fact this briefing of other people occurred on a number of occasions. It occurred in connection with Mr. Johnson visiting, Wally Johnson. It occurred with Clark MacGregor before he went to actually while he was at the Republican National Convention he was very desirous of knowing the facts. He was having intense press inquiries at that point in time. One time he called me to his room and he said I have to have the facts. Well, I called Ehrlichman, and said I had known Mr. MacGregor for a number of years, going back to my time on the House Judiciary Committee, and I felt very awkward. I said, I will have to check this out with Mr. Ehrlichman. I called Ehrlichman, he told me I could not brief MacGregor. So as MacGregor didn't have the facts when he would make public statements, Ziegler didn't have the facts. Ziegler was quite annoyed, but I told him that I could not give him the facts.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 7, 1973
[00.19.47] had-excuse me, sir. Senator INOUYE. Was that the only reason for destroying the records? Were you afraid the information might, be incriminating? Mr. PORTER. No, sir. In fact, just, the opposite. I made sure Mr. Reisner had seen it all. I just, physically, I had no reason to keep them. I had balanced with Mr. Sloan. He was satisfied. I was satisfied that, there, would be no questions regarding the money. I had asked Mr. Reisner to act as an independent auditor; he did. I started fresh, and threw the little slips of paper away. Senator INOUYE. Mr. Porter, after the Watergate trial, you sought a good Government job, did you not? Mr. PORTER. Yes, sir, I did, Senator INOUYE. And when Mr. Malek, through the White House, was not helpful, you went to Mr. LaRue and told him, "Listen, Fred, you know what I did at the trial. I have been loyal, I do not, expect to be treated better than anyone else, but I do not expect to be treated worse." And Mr. LaRue said, "I know, I will Contact John." Mr. PORTER. That is correct, sir. Senator INOUYE. Did this happen? Mr. PORTER. I think basically, yes. Senator INOUYE. Who is "John"? Mr. PORTER. I presume that is John Mitchell. Senator INOUYE. After that, did Mr. Magruder tell you that Mr. Haldeman had called Mr. Malek to insure that YOU would be taken care of? Mr. PORTER. Mr. Magruder told me that he had talked to Mr. Haldeman and that Mr. Haldeman had called Mr. Malek and had told him, in effect to kind of back off Porter, I think was the wording. Senator INOUYE. DO you know for a, fact, that 'Mr. Haldeman was aware of the situation? Mr. PORTER. 'NO, sir? I do not. I only, know what Mr. Magruder told me. Senator INOUYE. Did you got, a good Government job after that? Mr. PORTER. No, Sir; "not through that particular process, no, sir. on my own, I contacted one, of the department secretaries whom I knew personally, made arrangements to talk to him, and through a series of interviews, was offered a position in the Government at the end of March. At, the same time, as early as the latter part of January, I had been seeking employment in private industry, to have a choice between the two 'When the' time came for me to make a choice. Senator INOUYE. Was that that job subject to clearance by Mr. Malek? Mr. PORTER. I do not, know, sir. Senator INOUYE. Now, you advised the committee that You were in California on June 17 in the company of Mr. Mitchell and who else? Mr. PORTER. Mr. Mitchell, Mr. LaRue, Mr. Mardian, Mr. Magruder Mr. Raymond Caldero, who was in charge of our celebrities at that time. Senator INOUYE. And at that time, you received a call from Washington, or someone did receive a call. Mr. PORTER. That was in the morning. This was at the Beverly Hills Hotel, Mr. Caldero and I had come down from our rooms; at 8:30 to have breakfast. We sat down at a table next to Mr. and Mrs. LaRue, Mr. and Mrs. Mardian, and Mr. and -Mrs. Magruder. Senator INOUYE. So that is when you first learned about the Watergate break-in? Mr. PORTER. Well, in looking backwards, Senator, I guess you would have to say so, but at the time, no. The phone call that you are referring to is one that Mr. Magruder had received already, I think, because he came back to the table, and not to me, but to the people he was sitting with, said, "Do you know where I can find a secure phone?" And there was a discussion at the table, apparently, about where one might find a secure phone. And he turned to me, and he said, "Do you know where I can find a secure phone?" I said, "What for"? He said, "Well, Liddy is trying to call me, or wants to talk to me on a secure line." And I said, "'Well, we do have a direct outside line in the Mitchell suite, why don't you use that?" He said, "No, that is not good enough." I said, "Well, why don't you go out to a pay phone and call him back? Nobody's going to, you know, that is about all the security you are going to get." That was the end of that conversation. Senator INOUYE, Who took care of the situation there? Mr. PORTER. I beg your pardon, sir? Senator INOUYE. Who took charge of the situation there? Mr. PORTER. I am not sure I understand the question. Senator INOUYE. When this call was made, were the others agitated, or were they not? Mr. PORTER. Senator, I do not remember at the time. I think my back was to them and I do not remember seeing any expressions or conversation. Mr. Magruder appeared quite open about it at the time, in a loud voice. Senator INOUYE. Were you aware of a telephone call that Mr. Magruder made on June 18 from California at 4 in the morning? Mr. PORTER. You would have to qualify that, Senator. I understand that Mr. Magruder made or had phone conversations early Sunday morning with---- Senator INOUYE. Who was the party he contacted in Key Biscayne?, Mr. PORTER. I do not know, sir. I only know that-in fact, I think Mrs. Porter, who was sitting behind me, told me that Mrs. Magruder had told her-we were all kind of sitting or living in a suite of rooms on the same floor--that her husband had been on the phone all morning with Key Biscayne, I think was the quote, That is the, only Place I can remember where that statement might come from. [00.25.38]