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Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 26, 1973
[00.52.37-DEAN continues to discuss 1970 arrangements for DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE] 2. Housing. We discussed the appropriate housing of this operation and upon reflection, I that rather than a White House staffer looking for suitable space, that a professional intelligence person should be assigned the task of locating such space. Accordingly, I would suggest that a request be made that Mr. Hoover assign an agent to this task. In connection with the housing problem, I think serious consideration must be given to the appropriate Justice Department cover for the domestic intelligence operation. We discussed yesterday using IDIU as a cover and -as I indicated I believe that that is a most appropriate cover, I believe that it is generally felt that IDIU is already a far more extensive intelligence operation than has been mentioned publicly, and that the IDIU Operation cover would eliminate the problem of discovering a new intelligence Operation in the Department of Justice, However, I have reservations about the personnel in IDIU and its present operation activities and would suggest that they either be given a minor function within the new intelligence operation or that the Staff be, completely removed. I have had only incidental dealings with the personnel, other than Jim Devine, and cannot speak to their discretion and loyalty for such an operation. I do not believe that Jim Devine is capable of any major position within the new intelligence operation. However, I do believe that he could help perpetuate the cover and he has evidenced a loyalty to you, the Deputy, and other key people in the Department of Justice, despite his strong links with the prior Administration. I would defer to your judgment, of course, on any recommendation regarding Jim Devine's continued presence in such an intelligence operation, 3. Assistant to Attorney General. We also discussed the need for you to have a right hand man to assist in running this operation. It would seem that what Is needed is a man with administrative skills, a sensitivity to the implications of the current radical and subversive movements within the United States, and preferably, some background in intelligence work. To maintain the cover, I would think it appropriate for the man to have a law degree in that he will be a part of the Department of Justice. You suggested the possibility of using a prosecutor who had had experience with cases of this type. Accordingly, I have spoken with Harlington Wood to ask him to submit the names of five Assistant U.S. Attorneys who have had experience in dealing with demonstrations or riot type cases and who are mature individuals that might be appropriately given a sensitive assignment In the Department of Justice. I did not discuss the matter in any further detail with Wood other than to request the submission of some nominees. I would also like to suggest that we request names from the various intelligence agencies involved for personnel that might be appropriately involved in this activity or who might serve as your assistant. In summary, I recommend the following immediate actions. (1) You meet with Hoover, explain what must be done, and request his nominees for the interagency unit. (2) You request that Hoover assign an agent to the task of locating appropriate housing for the operations. (3) I request that other involved intelligence agencies submit nominees for the interagency unit. (4) I request from the agencies names of appropriate personnel for assignment to the operation. Finally, I would -suggest that you call weekly meetings to monitor the problems as they emerge and to make certain that we are moving this program into implementation as quickly as possible. It was signed, and had a note at the bottom: Bob Haldeman has suggested to me that if you would like him to join you in a meeting with Hoover he will be happy to do so. [END OF READING BY DEAN] Senator WEICKER. Thank you, Mr. Dean. Now, this, in other words, reefers to, that, portion of your statement yesterday when you say: "I wrote a memorandum requesting that the Evaluation Committee, be established and that the strings could be removed later, I told Haldeman that the only way to proceed would be one step at a time and this would be an important first step and he agreed." Mr. DEAN. That is correct. I might footnote that with the remark that I was quite aware Of a great interest in the matter, and after some discussions -with Mr. Huston, who still had a hope that the entire plan would be adopted, had reached the conclusion that there was no way the whole plan was going to be adopted and that the only thing that was essential was the, IEC and that this would satisfy everybody that we were at least doing something to solve the problem and this -was a first, step that seemed to solve or to resolve that pressure with everybody. Senator WEICKER. So, after this memorandum was written, you proceeded to set, up the IEC insofar as the structure, the placing of it, in the Internal Security Division, is that correct? Mr. DEAN-. I think what, happened is, and I am not terribly familiar with the, mechanics of how this actually did occur, I believe that Mr. Mitchell did have a conversation with Mr. Hoover and reached some agreement as to their participation. I don't know, how the decision was made to place it in the Internal Security unit, but I did learn about it at some point because they told me they had space that they had set aside in the Internal Security unit's office, which was separate and apart from the Department of Justice, the main Department of Justice. And I had learned that Mr. Doherty would be sort of the man that, would be heading the operation initially. [00.58.40]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 29, 1973 (2/2)
[01.22.13-INOUYE confronts DEAN'S claim to have been a "restraining influence" on spying and punishing political ENEMIES in the WHITE HOUSE] Senator INOUYE. Mr. Dean, I would like now to refer to a memo dated August 16, 1971, and you have testified that this -was prepared for Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman, and others at the White House. It is dated August 16, 1971. It is classified "Confidential." Subject: "Dealing With Our Political Enemies." I would like to read part of this: [01.22.43-DEAN was an architect of WHITE HOUSE plans to "screw our political enemies"] [QUOTING] This memorandum addresses the matter of how we can maximize the fact of our incumbency in dealing with Persons known to be active in their opposition to our Administration. Stated a bit more bluntly--how we can use the available federal machinery to screw our political enemies. After reviewing this matter with a number of persons possessed of expertise in the field, I have concluded that we do not need an elaborate mechanism or game plan, rather we need a good project coordinator and full support for the Project. In brief, the system would work as follows, [01.23.19-INOUYE reads from a memo written by DEAN outlining a White House plan to "screw our political enemies".] Key members of the staff (e.g., Colson, Dent, Flanigan, Buchanan) should be requested to inform us as to who they feel we should be giving a hard time. The. project coordinator should then determine what sorts of dealings these individuals have with the federal government and how we can best screw them (e.g., grants availability, federal contracts, litigation, prosecution etc.). The project coordinator then should have access to and the full support of the top officials of the agency or department in proceeding to deal with the individual. [01.24.00] Senator INOUYE. This is a very important memorandum. Is this your idea, of restraining influence? [01.24.10-DEAN explains that he prepared the memorandum on "how to screw our political enemies" in collaboration with others and only under intense pressure to do so, consistent with earlier testimony] Mr. DEAN. As I said, Senator, in the memorandum, first of all, as I answered that question yesterday, it took a good bit of push before I would prepare even a document like that, I had request after request after request to prepare this. I didn't know a thing about how to handle something like this, so I went, and talked to other people about it. I think that is indicated in the memorandum itself. I also made it very clear in the he memorandum that. this is something that I personally was not going to get involved in. Whoever that project coordinator was going to be, it was not going to be John Dean because, I just didn't want to get involved in doing the sort of things they -wanted. [01.24.52-DEAN states that suggestions for ENEMIES LIST activities were constantly sent to his office, and he ignored them as much as possible] As I say, when the thing didn't float, they kept sending their political enemies suggestions back to me. I never did a thing to get a project coordinator. There was some rather loose talk about individuals who might handle this; I can't even recall their names now. I made no effort to find somebody to head this up and while there was a conception on behalf of some who kept sending these things in for my political enemies project, there. was no political enemies project operating out of my office. [01.25.23-DEAN states that he wrote the memo as a minimum possible step to satisfy his superiors] So I thought that while the memo had gone out and you know, satisfied my superiors that something was being done, in fact, it was not, being done, So I felt there was a restraint. [01.25.36] Senator INOUYE. It is your testimony, then, that this memo described an activity which in the minds of your supporters, was considered important? Mr. DEAN. That is correct. Senator INOUYE. It was not a wild or crazy scheme? Mr. DEAN. To me it was a wild and crazy scheme, because I felt I just didn't operate that way. [01.26.02] Senator INOUYE. Was it considered wild or crazy scheme for Mr. Haldeman or Mr. Ehrlichman? Mr. DEAN. No. sir. Senator INOUYE. In your testimony, you have submitted several exhibits With of names--politicos Members of Congress, members of the media. and members of the entertainment field, et cetera, Mr. DEAN. I might add also, Senator, before we go forward, I didn't believe that list is complete in and of itself, it just happens to be a part that I received and had access to before my files were shut down. There may well be additional names and additional information available on that. Senator INOUYE. Mr. Dean. I believe one list would have been enough. Mr. DEAN. Indeed it would. [01.26.57] Senator INOUYE. And on one of your exhibits, you had a copy of a memo which suggested that certain things be done, such as calling the Internal Revenue Service. Now, in addition to that, you testified that in one of your meetings with President Nixon, you quoted The President as saying, "We will take care Of them after the election." when the President referred to enemy newsmen. Is that correct, sir? Mr. DEAN. That is correct. [01.27.32]
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 26, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean.
Senator Joseph Montoya (D New Mexico). Now on April 30 he made this statement, "We must maintain the integrity of the White House and that integrity must be real, not transparent. There can be no whitewash at the White House." Is that a correct statement? John Dean. Well, I would like to make this comment regarding the April 30th speech. As I testified yesterday, after I issued my statement that I would not be a scapegoat. I had virtually no contact with members of the staff. However, I did have occasion to talk to Len Garment. And when the President went off to Camp David to prepare his major address which is the one you are referring to, I told Mr. Garment, I said, "I have no way to get this message through to the President at this point in time. However, I would ask you one thing, Len." I said, "Would you please tell the President in your own words, do not give a cosmetic speech. And I asked him to do what he could to get the President to lay out the facts as the President could have laid them out at that time. Senator Joseph Montoya (D New Mexico). Do you know whether he followed through on that? John Dean. He did not follow through on that.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 27, 1973
[00.02.00-DEAN answering questions from Sen. GURNEY, who wants to make DEAN out to be the primary architect of the COVERUP, in keeping with the White House's "BLAME IT ON DEAN" strategy] Mr. DEAN.----and shred documents. I had to come up in my own mind with a persuasive argument for Mr. Ehrlichman as to why not to "deep-six" and destroy documents. I decided the best, way to persuade him was to tell him that there was a chance that the men who had drilled the safe had seen it, that the Secret Service agent who was present at the time of the drilling had seen it, that Mr. Fielding and Mr. Kehrli had been there and had seen it, and, of course, Mr. Fielding had gone, through all of the documents and for -all those people, to be, quizzed by the FBI would result in an awful lot of lying. [00.02.34] Senator GURNEY. Was it, your suggestion to turn those papers over to Mr. Gray? Mr. DEAN, Yes, it was because I told Mr.--- Senator GURNEY. Why did you suggest this? Mr. DEAN. I told Mr. Ehrlichman that if I were ever asked I wanted to be able to testify that, I turned everything over to the FBI and subsequently when that came up and they were getting more Specific with that I told---- Senator GURNEY. What was the conversation in the office at the time the documents were turned over to Mr. Gray?, Mr. DEAN. Well I it was a very brief conversation and, as, I say, my encounter during that was very short. I had preceded Mr. Gray, as I recall the sequence, to Mr. Ehrlichman's office. Mr. Ehrlichman informed me he was going to meet with him and said, "Bring the documents over." I brought the documents over and laid them on a coffee table in Mr. Ehrlichman's office. Senator GURNEY. Didn't you and Ehrlichman agree to set up the meeting? [00.03.24-GURNEY will not accept that DEAN was following EHRLICHMAN'S lead in the coverup] Mr. DEAN. I have the impression Mr. Ehrlichman was going to Meet with Mr. Gray on something else. That it was not specifically on this subject. Senator GURNEY. I thought You said You suggested to Mr. Ehrlichman that you have a meeting with Gray to turn the documents over to him. Mr. DEAN. I suggested we turn them directly over to Mr. Gray, and Mr. Ehrlichman, and after I turned the rest, of the material over and I was still holding this I thought we ought to get the remainder over, called--that happened on a Thursday or Friday, over the weekend. I said--there is a delay here-and called Ehrlichman on Monday and he said, "I am meeting with Mr. Gray this evening, why don't you bring documents over then," something of that nature. Senator GURNEY. 'NOW then, what transpired when they were turned over? Mr. DEAN. As I said, I took the documents and had a very brief discussion with Ehrlichman. I laid them on the coffee table in Ehrlichman's office. Mr. Gray was called up from the reception area, came in and Mr. Ehrlichman made the initial--initially raised the matter, said something to the that these are materials from Mr. Hunt's safe, I believe, Dean has turned over other material to the Bureau directly. Senator GURNEY. Did you have. any discussion with Mr. Ehrlichman when you brought the documents in and laid them on the coffee table? Mr. DEAN. I am sure there -was. Senator GURNEY. What was-- Mr. DEAN. About this was the way I could very easily handle the Situation if I was ever asked if Mr. Gray had been useful and seen them. Senator GURNEY. Did You discuss with Mr. Ehrlichman what you might be going to tell Mr. Gray? Mr. DEAN. I was going to tell him that I did not think these related to the Watergate incident, which I did not. Senator GURNEY. No, I am talking about the, papers. The purpose of the meeting was to turn some very ,sensitive documents over to Mr. Gray. Mr. DEAN. Yes. Senator GURNEY. So YOU could get rid of them and Mr. Ehrlichman could get rid of them. Now, prior to his coming into the office, I understand that, you went in and took the papers in and laid them down. My question is, did you have any discussion with Mr. Ehrlichman at that time to what you were going to tell Mr. Gray when you turned the papers over-or when he turned them over? [00.05.36] Mr. DEAN. It was pretty well understood what the meeting was for, so it was not necessary to have any extended discussion other than the fact that, the, documents were very politically sensitive, that as I recall, I called them political dynamite when I raised them with Gray, that he should take custody of them, and that that would be the way to handle it as far as the White House -was concerned. I do not recall any discussion of telling Mr. Gray to destroy the documents. [00.06.07-GURNEY wants to resolve a conflict between GRAY'S recollection and DEAN in favor of the WHITE HOUSE.] Senator GURNEY. You and Mr. Ehrlichman must have had, certainly some feeling that Mr. Gray was not going to take this back to the FBI and put it in the files somewhere. Mr. DEAN. Well, he was told that they should never be leaked or be made public, something to that effect, Yes. Senator GURNEY. Well, did you 'discuss something to that, effect before he came in the office? Mr. DEAN. Well, Senator, if we did, I have certainly no recollection of it at this time. As I recall the transaction, it, was brief, I came, over immediately preceding the meeting, Gray was called up, there was this brief conversation. Gray, was virtually en route up. He came in. This was explained to him. He at that point in time, as I recall, placed the documents in a small sort of briefcase--not really a briefcase, but one of these thin legal briefcases that he placed the documents in, and seemed quite willing to take them. He did not have a lot of hesitancy and he seemed to understand that indeed, this was an appropriate proceeding although an unusual one. [00.07.19]
Capitol Journal - 1985 - Year in Review
Back outside the Capital Building Carter introduces topic of tax reform and segues to footage, President Reagan asks his large cheering audience about tax reform in outdoor rally in Oshkosh, WI. Representative DAN ROSTENKOWSKI (D-IL) says the Democrats will support Reagan's tax plan, shot of Rostenkowski speaking with James Baker, Baker holds up a copy of the proposed new tax code to a meeting of the House Ways and Means Committee, footage of lobbyists outside the Committee meeting - bustling about the halls and using the phones, at a press conference outside the Committee room Rostenkowski announces the bi-partisan formulation of a new tax code, shot of the Presidential motorcade heading toward the Capital Building, Reagan walks down a long corridor surrounded by an entourage
Lawmakers April 28 1983
Representative Dave Obey (D - Wisconsin), House Appropriations Committee, very frankly once that ambassador is appointed, the administration will have an excuse to say to Congress, Look boys, you asked for this an now as long as we have an ambassador appointed at your request - you have an obligation to meet our funding requests.
Lawmakers - 2/24/1983
Paul Duke and Linda Wertheimer discuss progress of Social Security Reform, a compromise on the Social Security Commission s recommendations looks set to clear the House Ways and Means Committee. Discussion of the provisions of the bill. The bill will ensure Social Security for a few years, the long-term is still unclear.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 12, 1973
[00.07.27] Senator MONTOYA. Did you ask Mr. Magruder or Mr. LaRue for a Government job during your discussions with him about your grand jury testimony? Mr. PORTER. To answer that question specifically, I would have to answer no, but there is some yes in it and if I could perhaps explain that. In January of this year, when we were getting through with the President's inauguration, obviously the thoughts turned to future employment and I got Mr.-- Mr. Magruder told me that I believe it was Mr. Malek at the White House Could be, could possibly be an obstruction to my getting a good job with the Government, and I asked Mr. Magruder what he thought I should do about it,. He said "Well, I think Mr. Mitchell could probably help you a little bit, 'You know, he's still got some clout there." So I said, "What is the, best way to do that? Should I call him directly or what?" He said, "No, why don't you talk to Fred LaRue?" So I believe I went over and talked to Mr. LaRue, and the conversation went something like my saying "Fred, you know this problem that, I have with Mr. Malek." I said "'I have been a pretty loyal guy." And he said, I know that." And I said, "Now, I do not want to be treated any better than anybody else but I sure as heck don't want to be treated any worse than anybody else, I either. Do you think Mr. Mitchell could. perhaps make a Call and unloose the log jam a little bit"' He said, "Yes, I will call him." And I understand that he did. That was the extent of that conversation. Senator MONTOYA. Why were you concerned about Mr. Malek obstructing any move that you might, make? Mr. PORTER. Mr. Malek was in charge of handing out Government jobs, Senator, and that didn't sound too good when he heard that he perhaps could be an obstruction to my getting one and I wanted to see what I can do. Senator MONTOYA. What reason did you have to believe that? Mr. PORTER. I believe, strictly personal, Senator. I was between Mr. Malek and me. Senator MONTOYA. Was it, your understanding around the CRP on important decisions, that Mr. Haldeman should be informed? Mr. PORTER. Yes, sir. Senator MONTOYA, And what sphere of decisions would you say covered any communications between the CRP and Mr. Haldeman at the White House? Mr. PORTER. Senator, I can only--I would have to Confine My answer to my area of involvement in the surrogate scheduling program, but everything that I did, all reports, all plans, all schedules, all States, key States, times et cetera were all sent to Mr. Haldeman. Senator MONTOYA. Did that include disbursements? Mr. PORTER. Sir, I am not aware of that. I was never asked to give Mr. Haldeman or anybody like that, any--- Senator MONTOYA. Well, would you say definitely that it did not include disbursement? Mr. PORTER. I would say that to my knowledge, it did not include any disbursements that I made but that is as far as I could go. Senator MONTOYA. You mentioned that for every disbursement that you made you had received a receipt? Mr. PORTER. Yes, sir. Senator MONTOYA. From the recipient? Mr. PORTER, Yes, sir, Senator MONTOYA. How long did you keep those receipts? Mr. PORTER. The initial receipts from the pre-April 7 money I kept until the end of March, I believe when Mr. Sloan asked me to balance with him. I did. The figure was approximately $52,000. I had balanced, I had no reason to keep the receipts any longer-excuse me, and so I throw them away. I had additional receipts that were in my possession until after the Watergate break-in and I would say approximately a week or 10 days after the break-in I believe it Was Mr. LaRue who came by my office and said, "You know, if You have anything that might be politically sensitive or whatever," again using the immediate discovery story of the Democrats civil suit, you know, "Why don't you just throw it away." So I went through a few things and I didn't think I had anything politically sensitive but in that same process I did ask Mr. Reisner to come in again and we did balance, and Mr. Reisner was made aware of the money and the cash on hand and the amount of money received from Mr. Sloan, et cetera, and those receipts, they were thrown away. [00.12.39]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 14, 1973
[00.07.17] Senator INOUYE. So you are. not personally aware of the conversation? Mr. MAGRUDER. I was in California at the time, sir, and he was, Mr. Liddy was, instructed to go out there. Senator INOUYE. Did you have any conversations with Mr. Kleindienst? Mr. MAGRUDER. No, sir. Senator INOUYE. When you appeared before, the grand jury did the prosecutor ask you anything about Mr. Sloan's testimony that you had requested that he perjure himself? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, sir, we had a, lengthy discussion with Mr. Silbert and, I think, with Mr. Campbell, I think ink, at that time over that question, and I think they agreed with me, and still do, that there was a difference of opinion. He, was in a certain--he had certain fixed opinions on that situation that I think related more to personal matters, than they did to the, facts in the case. Senator INOUYE. At that time you were lying, were you not? Mr. MAGRUDER. No, sir; not about my discussions, with Mr. Sloan. Senator INOUYE. Why did they not ask you that in the trial? Mr. MAGRUDER. I am sorry. Why did they not ask me? Senator INOUYE. The prosecutors. Mr. MAGRUDER. Which question? Senator INOUYE. About your suggesting to Mr. Sloan that he perjure himself? Mr. MAGRUDER. I do not think that, was relevant to the case was on the. docket, at that time. The case, had nothing to do with Mr. Sloan. Senator INOUYE. It had something to do with the, Watergate, did it not? Mr. MAGRUDER. You would have to ask the prosecutors why they did not ask that, question. I can see no relevance to a disagreement as to exactly was said between Mr. Sloan and I. I think. Senator, just to follow up, the prosecution, I think last week indicated there was still a difference and that they had agreed with my interpretation of that. discussion. Senator INOUYE. I would like to discuss your discussions with Mr. Haldeman. You had one on the telephone at Key Biscayne. Any others after that.? Mr. MAGRUDER. On the Watergate, Senator? Senator INOUYE. Yes. Mr. MAGRUDER. No, until the January discussion. Then, we met with Mr. Mitchell in April and then I had a couple of phone conversations with his assistant when I--just to let him know that I had decided, because I now had retained independent counsel, that I would cooperate and in cooperating that certain people would be Implicated. [00.09.45] Senator INOUYE. Now, when you discussed this matter in January, I presume that you told Mr. Haldeman everything you knew about the coverup? Mr. MAGRUDER. I think my main Purpose was to just indicate that there were a lot of people involved and that in case people's memory was growing short I hoped he realized it was not myself or any other single individual who was Involved in this Senator INOUYE. This was In January? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, sir. Senator INOUYE. Were you surprised when the President announced that He, had decided to begin an investigation on March 21? Mr. MAGRUDER. Was I surprised Senator INOUYE. Yes. [00.10.33] Mr. MAGRUDER Well, knowing full -well of Mr. Dean's role I could well imagine that the President possibly had been informed incorrectly, since he was investigating his own problem, I could See where he could very easily have misled individuals at the White House, to protect himself Senator INOUYE. But you had notified Mr. Haldeman in January Of the correct activities. Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes, sir. Senator INOUYE. You expected Mr. Haldeman to communicate with the President did you not? Mr. MAGRUDER. On that matter, sir? Senator INOUYE. Yes. Mr. MAGRUDER. I did not expect--I was talking mainly to be sure that Mr. Porter was taken care of directly after the inaugural and to discuss my own employment situation. I did not expect him to discuss my discussion necessarily With the President unless he felt it was appropriate I did not go to him to go to the President only went to him as the senior man at the White House. Senator INOUYE. But you did discuss the and the coverup, did you not? Mr. MAGRUDER. Yes;' but I did it for the purpose Of explaining the total context of the coverup and the Watergate plan. Senator INOUYE. Mr. Magruder, in your testimony this morning you have Indicated that there were several who knew about the coverup such as Mr. LaRue, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Dean, and I believe you used two words, "and others." Could you tell us about the others? Mr. MAGRUDER. I think Mr., Mardian was to some extent involved.
LAWMAKERS
03.10.49-WETA credit/Sponsor credits/title sequence 03.11.40-PAUL DUKE/COKIE ROBERTS/LINDA WERTHEIMER in studio-on Program: CONGRESS reacts to REAGAN'S veto of APPROPRIATIONS BILL, profiles of Reps. JAMIE WHITTEN (D-MS), SYLVIO CONTE (R-MA). DUKE-battle over budget now is one of Institutional "turf", established roles of CONGRESS and PRESIDENT. 03.12.44-Clip of REAGAN giving TV address from OVAL OFFICE (dated 9/24/81) on plan for "economic recovery". Shot of BUDGET COMMITTEE meeting. Shot of REAGAN walking to podium to speak to joint session of Congress, Shot of REAGAN speaking to group of SENATE REPUBLICANS, Shot of REAGAN speaking to CONGRESSIONAL LUNCHEON at WHITE HOUSE. DUKE v.o.-CONGRESS approved REAGAN'S first requests for BUDGET CUTS, but REAGAN had to drop "nice guy" tactics when CONGRESS resisted later cuts. 03.13.38-Shot of REAGAN speaking to press, explaining his VETO of the APPROPRIATIONS package. DUKE-VETO angered both DEMOCRATS and many REPUBLICANS-resentment of REAGAN trying to intrude on CONGRESS' prerogatives. Shots of CONGRESSMEN in debate. Shot of Rep. JAMIE WHITTEN (D-MS), arguing that budgets and spending are Legislative responsibilities, the Executive Branch has no right to dictate the budget to Congress. Shots of WHITTEN and SYLVIO CONTE (R-MA) debating funds for PUBLIC HEALTH HOSPITALS in a friendly manner. 03.15.10-WERTHEIMER in studio-intro report on JAMIE WHITTEN and SYLVIO CONTE, their working relationship, power of HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE. 03.15.52-Shot of Rep. CONTE, remarks that since he's a Yankee, he sometimes thinks he needs an interpreter to talk to WHITTEN. Shot of JAMIE WHITTEN in a rural MISSISSIPPI GUN SHOP, the owner gripes about the N.R.A.. Shot of WHITTEN on a main street of TUPELO. Shot of WHITTEN walking down hallway of Capitol. WERTHEIMER v.o.-narrates WHITTEN'S career in congress and rise to hold power over APPROPRIATIONS. Shot of Rep. TOM FOLEY, says his one rule was to never have an unneccessary argument with WHITTEN. Stills of WHITTEN in committee meetings. FOLEY calls WHITTEN "a permanent Secretary of Agriculture". 03.17.46-Shot of Carol Foreman, former assist. Sec. Of Agriculture, says WHITTEN is very knowledgeable about all appropriations bills. WHITTEN v.o.-knowledge is essential to persuasion. Shot of workers in WHITTEN'S offices, WERTHEIMER v.o. notes that WHITTEN'S office suite is locate about two steps from the HOUSE FLOOR. Shot of WHITTEN seated in armchair, says that he tries to have a moderate leadership style on the committee. WHITTEN-anyone who knows the subject has an advantage in politics. 03.19.31-Shot of WHITTEN entering committee meeting, WERTHEIMER v.o.-WHITTEN led the HOUSE element in joint meetings with SENATE to put together a funding package that REAGAN would not veto. Shots of the joint committee meeting. Shot of John Kramer, an agricultural consultant, praises WHITTEN'S work ethic and energy. Shot of WHITTEN, says "you don't run a committee, you preside over it," favors a loose style of chairmanship. 03.20.58-Shot of Rep. WHITTEN in well of House. WERTHEIMER v.o.-WHITTEN'S office produced an appropriations bill that he thought would satisfy REAGAN, but REAGAN vetoed it. WHITTEN addresses HOUSE, urging CONGRESS to vote to override the VETO, calls for bipartisan support. Shot of WHITTEN seated in armchair, says he's disturbed, that Congress can't be forced to give in to REAGAN. 03.22.43--Series of Stills from WHITTEN'S Congressional career. Shot of Rep. FOLEY in office, says WHITTEN'S a transition from old autocratic committee chairmen to new style. WHITTEN in armchair, says he was always a political realist, he's adjusted to changing conditions, he's supposed to represent the People as they are, can't go back to days of Sam Rayburn.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 29, 1973 (1/2)
[00.32.00-DEAN tries to explain his position with regard to the personal use of campaign funds in his care-it complicates his position that he has destroyed evidence that supports his own position, that he was not trying to steal the money] Mr. DEAN. If I were not perfectly candid with this committee, it would not be very difficult to manufacture another check. Mr. THOMPSON. I assume you would not do that, Mr. Dean. Mr. DEAN. I would not do that, no, sir. Mr. THOMPSON. I do not think we will even discuss possible further perjury or any activity of that nature. [00.32.20] Mr. SHAFFER. I object to the -word "further," Mr. Chairman. Mr. THOMPSON. That Objection, if the Chair will allow me to comment on it, is well taken. But it was your intent and what -was in your mind at the time, that puzzles me, Mr. Dean. Under ordinary circumstances, I -would say that a man of your dealings, dealing in stock--if I might finish--with personal affairs involving great sums of money, that even in ordinary circumstances, it would be highly unusual for anyone to tear up a check, for any reason. Maybe not. But it would seem that way to me. But under these circumstances, when you knew in your own mind that there might be some question about it, to the extent that you went through these gyrations to set up this trustee account, when you realized there might be some question, that you would destroy the only documentary evidence that might substantiate that testimony. [00.33.33] Mr. DEAN. Well, let me repeat something that I think should be very clear on the record. I at no time thought there was any way in the world that I would not have to account, in full for that, money. Too many people were aware of it. Mr. Howard was aware that it had come to me. Mr. Strachan was aware that it had come, to me. I had told Mr. Fielding that, I had it in my possession. I assume that they had possibly told other people about it, the fact that the money had ended up in my safe. The first occasion that it came to my mind, the point where I thought it ought to be revealed to the Government, -was after I went to my attorney. I -revealed it as it -was. We discussed back at that time that after we made the moves to open up the trustee accounts that really, through inadvertence rather than serious thought, I had destroyed the first check based on an accounting that my attorney had made. He said, tear up the first check and issue me a new check; it will be negotiable able. Now, that is the way the facts are. Mr. THOMPSON. Had you already started preparing your statement that you were going to use here today? Mr. DEAN. No, sir: I was not preparing the statement then. I was trying to go over at that time just my chronology of my knowledge as to the sequence of events. I was having meetings with the prosecutors some of this was just by, you know, trying to give them the facts as I knew them. [00.34.09] Mr. THOMPSON. Maybe I got, the wrong implication or impression a minute ago in response, to a question of Mr. Dash. The impression I got was that you were stating, in effect, that you never would have had to return that money, but you came, forward and did it anyway because nobody -would have known about it, something to that elect. Now you state that, correctly, Mr. Howard knew about it, Mr. Strachan knew about it, you assumed that they had told others about it. So--- [00.35.38] Mr. DEAN. What I am saying is not that no one would have ever known I had taken out, the, money. I could have put, the cash back in. That was not, my intention. When I, in fact, knew that I had handled that money, I felt I ought to state I had handled that money. I raised it with my lawyer, told him what I had done, and that is the, way it occurred. [00.35.59] Mr. THOMPSON. At, the, time, you went to your lawyer. you were, of course, shall we say estranged from the White House? I believe you said you got a different impression when you got back from Camp David. You said you were not going to play the coverup. game any longer and you got a different, impression from Haldeman as to his relationship with YOU and what he thought, about, you, that sort of thing. Did it ever occur to you that they might have access to your safe, or that they might be talking to Mr. Howard, they might be talking to Mr. Strachan, and they could go to the safe at any time? Mr. DEAN. At that, point, they were on their way to California. There was no problem with that, happening. Mr. THOMPSON. So there were, other people At the White House you still assumed were friends at that time? Mr. DEAN. There was only one person who had a combination to that, safe and it would been an extraordinary act, if they had come, in at that point when they were still dealing with me and trying to solicit my testimony as to what it was going to be for suddenly one night my safe to disappear. So I do not think that that Is a fair assumption. [00.37.07]
July 29, 1994 - Part 1
(10:32:05) OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PAUL S. SARBANES Senator SABARNES. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I want to commend you. for the care, thoroughness, and fairness with which you have prepared the Committee for these hearings. The Senate first provided for the holding of these bearings, such as the one now taking place, in the sense of a Senate resolution approved last March. In that resolution, it was directed that any such hearings, and I quote: Should be structured Find sequenced in such a manner that they would not interfere with the ongoing investigation of Special Counsel Robert B. Fiske, Jr. In late May, the Independent Counsel, Mr. Fiske, informed Congress that he would soon conclude one portion of his investigation and that a congressional inquiry of matters included in that portion would not interfere with his efforts. Accordingly, on June 9, the Majority Leader, Senator Mitchell, proposed initial hearings that would avoid interference with Mr. Fiske's investig ation, Under Senator Mitchell's proposal, the Senate would conduct hearings on three subjects that were part of the first phase of Mr, Fiske's investigation and which the Independent Counsel indicated he was likely to finish by early summer. On June 21, the Senate passed Senate Resolution 229, which directed this Committee, the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and I quote. to: Conduct hearing-, into whether improper conduct occurred regarding one., communications between officials of the White House and the Department of the Treasury or the Resolution Trust Corporation relating to the Whitewater Development Corporation and the Madison A Guaranty Savings & Loan Association Two, the Park Service Police investigation into the death of White House Deputy Counsel, Vincent Foster. And three, the way in which White House officials handled documents in the Office of White House Deputy Counsel, Vincent Foster, at the time of his death, From the Senate resolution. Now, the Senate Banking Committee meets today to carry out the directives contained in that. resolution. Since the, enactment of the resolution, Independent Counsel Fiske has announced that, contrary to his earlier expectations, lie has not concluded his inquiry into the handling of documents in the Office of the White House Deputy Counsel, Vincent Foster. 10 Therefore, consistent with the March 17 Senate resolution that hearings should be structured and sequenced in such a manner that they would not interfere with the ongoing investigation of the Special Counsel, the Committee will not address that issue in these bearings. Next week the Committee will hold an extensive set of hearings to review the communications that took place between officials of the White House and the Department of the Treasury or the Resolution Trust Corporation and the Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan Association. The Committee will have the opportunity, then, to hear from and to question a number of officials as to the propriety of their conduct. In that -regard, it is important to note that on June 30, the Independent Counsel, Mr. Fiske, issued a statement that be bad completed his investigation of contacts between White House and Treasury Department officials and reached the conclusion that the evidence does not justify a criminal Prosecution. Now, of course, I'm mindful that conduct can be improper without being criminal, but it is essential to be clear, I believe, about any question of criminality in, these matters. In his statement, Mr. Fiske concluded, and I quote him: After a review of all the evidence, we have concluded that the evidence is insufficient to establish that anyone within the White House or the Department of the Treasury acted with the intent to corruptly influence an RTC investigation. Therefore, the evidence of the events surrounding the contacts between the White House and the Treasury Department does not justify the prosecution of anyone for a violation of section 1505. We have also concluded that the evidence does not justify a criminal prosecution for violation of any other Federal statute.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, May 23, 1973
Mr. Gerald ALCH. On January 8, 1973 the first day of trial, I learned that Mr. William O. Bitman's client, Mr. Hunt had offered to plead to any and all counts of the indictment immediately prior to trial. But, that Chief Judge Sirica had said that he would not entertain any change of plea until after jury selection and opening statements. This appeared to me to be highly prejudicial to my client, for it would tend to give the jury the impression that after the government's opening statement one of the defendants had thrown in the towel so to speak overwhelmed with weight of the evidence against him. I felt that this could and should have been avoided by a change of plea being resolved prior to the commencement of trial since this had been the request of defendant Hunt. I had told Mr. McCord that our routine once trial began would be for him to spend sometime each day immediately after court with Mr. Shankman and myself to review what had gone on that day and to discuss what was to happen the following day. I wanted to discuss with Mr. Bitman the details of his clients proposed change of plea in order to ascertain whether or not there would be a basis for a miss-trial. It was agreed that we would meet at his office immediately after court was concluded for that day. Mr. Shankman, Mr. McCord and I hailed a cab and at the last minute co-defendant Barker asks if he could ride in the cab with us. Where at that time Mr. Barker was going or why he was going to Mr. Bitman's office as I eventually ascertained I do not know. There was no significant conversation with Mr. Barker in the cab. Mr. McCord has alleged that I told him that the purpose of going to Mr. Bitman's office was that Mr. Bitman wanted to talk with him (Mr. McCord) about "who's word he would trust regarding a White House offer of executive clemency" and that Mr. Bitman wanted to talk to Mr. Barker as well. This is not true. I merely said to Mr. McCord that prior to the schedule daily post court meeting between he, Mr. Shankman and myself that we would stop at Mr. Bitman's office for I wanted to discuss with him the ramifications and the details of Mr. Hunt's proposed change of plea.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 25, 1973
[00.12.49-DEAN discusses further the attempts, at the urging of EHRLICHMAN, to involve the CIA in the coverup] I would like to skip the paragraph on page regarding the call from Gray, and turn to the last paragraph on 77. On the morning Of June, 28, I arranged again to meet with General Walters I was first embarrassed about requesting the meeting because, he had been most explicit and convincing to me in the first meeting. I told him that, I requested the meeting at Ehrlichman's request to further discuss the problems of the Dahlberg and 'Mexican checks. I told him what I knew about the matters and that, to the best of my knowledge. they were not related to the Watergate incident. I then asked him if he had any Suggestions. He., expressed sympathy over the situation, but said there was nothing his agency could do. He again explained reasons similar to his earlier comments regarding CIA involvement and I expressed my understanding. I then asked him if he had any ideas at and He said that it might, be possible to explain the matter as an anti-Castro activity. We had some general discussion of this, but nothing concrete emerged from the discussion, Before Walters departed I assured him that I agreed that it would be most unwise to involve the CIA, and I thanked him--almost apologetically--for coming by again. At no time did I push him as I had been instructed. At the, conclusion of this meeting I was totally convinced as I had been earlier, that the CIA could not and would not be brought in to solve the problems confronting the, White House and reelection committee as a result of the Watergate incident. [00.14.24] I subsequently informed Ehrlichman and Haldeman that unless the, President directly ordered the CIA to provide support for those involved that the, CIA was not, going to get involved I told them I agreed with Walters that this would be a terrible mistake and they both told me they agreed. TRANSMITTING THE MATERIALS IN- MR. HUNT'S SAFE TO THE FBI. I would now like to explain the transmitting of the materials in Hunt's safe to the FBI. As I noted earlier, shortly after the FBI interview on June 22 of Colson and -my later instructions from Ehrlichman to "Deep Six" the briefcase and shred documents. I had informed the FBI that I would forward the material found in Hunt's Office. After weighing the implications of Ehrlichman's instructions to destroy the items I decided that I would not engage in any such activity myself or be pushed into it. Accordingly, I asked David Young to return the. State Department cable to my office. I had already returned the briefcase from my car trunk to my office. I received several calls from the FBI requesting the material, but I had not yet, figured out how, to tell Ehrlichman I was not going to destroy the material. I knew I had to develop a good argument to give Ehrlichman as to why the materials should not be destroyed. On June 25 or 26 I went to Ehrlichman to explain that I thought the men who drilled the safe. had probably seen the briefcase, that the Secret, Service agent who was present had probably seen some of the Material; that Mr. Kehrli and Fielding had seen it--and what would happen -when all those people were later asked by the FBI about the contents of the safe. [EHRLICHMAN pressures DEAN to withhold the evidence from HUNT'S safe from the FBI, DEAN decides to turn over the evidence] Then, I said I felt we must turn over the material to the FBI. With regard to the, sensitive documents I suggested that they be given directly to Gray. I told Ehrlichman that, if ever asked under oath, I had to be able to testify that to the best of my knowledge everything found in the, safe had been turned over to the FBI. The FBI agents came to my office, I believe on June 26 or 27, I gave them one box, which had been packed and told them as soon as the other material was packed I would get it to them. I got tied up in a, meeting, I phoned Fielding and asked him to pack up the, remainder of the materials, which I believe was, the State Department cables and the briefcase. He, did so and turned over the' remainder of the, materials -With the, exception Of the two envelopes which contained the politically sensitive materials I described earlier. I spoke with Ehrlichman on the 28th and informed him the Materials.' had been sent to the FBI with the exception of the politically sensitive documents. He told me, He was meeting later that day with Gray I should bring them over at that at time. I went to Ehrlichman's office just before _Mr. Gray arrived. I placed the envelopes on the, coffee, table in his office. When Gray arrived, Ehrlichman told him that we, had some material for him that had come from Hunt's safe. Ehrlichman described it as politically sensitive, but not related to the Watergate. I told Gray that Fielding and I had gone through Hunt's documents and had turned over all the materials to the agents except the documents in these two envelopes. I said we did not believe they related to the Watergate in any way, but should they leak out they would be, political dynamite in an election year. I believe at that point Gray placed the two envelopes in his briefcase. [00.17.56] At no time while I was present with Gray and Ehrlichman was he instructed by myself or Ehrlichman to destroy the documents. Rather, he was merely told that they must never be leaked or made public. I departed and returned to -my office. The next time the fact of giving these documents to Gray came up was shortly before the criminal Watergate trial in January of this year. Fielding. Kehrli and I were being interviewed by the" prosecutors regarding the handling of the materials in Hunt's safe to establish the evidentiary chain. At one point, in the interview, I asked Henry Petersen, who was present with 'Mr. Earl Silbert. if I could speak with him privately At that time I felt I had to tell Petersen that not all the materials from Hunts safe had gone directly to the agents. rather that two envelopes of material. the. contents of which I 'Could not itemize any better then than I can now, had been given directly to Gray. [00.18.50]
Eric Johnston Urges Movie Tax Cut In Movie Taxes
Eric Johnston Urges Movie Tax Cut In Movie Taxes: Eric Johnston, President of the motion pictures association makes a strong plea, before a House Committee, for a reduction of wartime excise taxes levied against the movie industry. State Representative, Mr. King, ask Mr. Johnston to elaborate on the admission taxes and raw film stock taxes.
Lawmakers, March 22, 1984
DO NOT USE image of front page of Washington Post, March 14, 1984. Comments that Meese was hurt by a revelation of an unreported $15,000 loan from a friend who later got a White House job. The loan was used to purchase stock, also unreported, raising questions about the thoroughness of the Senate Committee investigation.
Lawmakers May 3 1984
Representative Fernand St. Germain (D - Rhode Island), chair of House Banking Committee, We want to ensure that the consumer issues and thoughts and the welfare of the consumer is included in this because up until this time we ve only heard from the financial industry, the institutions who want the changes for their benefit.
Capitol Journal - 1985 - Year in Review
Senators PHIL GRAMM (R-TX), WARREN RUDMAN (R-NH), and ERNEST HOLLINGS (D-SC) announce the Senate's passage of their balanced budget bill at a press conference - interspersed with various shots of Senate committee negotiations, shot of man carrying the Gram, Rudman, Hollings Bill down the halls of the White House to the President
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 12, 1973
[00.52.07] Senator WEICKER. All right. Were there other documents or other instances where Miss Duncan performed services relative to---- Mr. PORTER, Yes, sir, I believe it was Miss Duncan. On one occasion, Senator Muskie's speech that he was going to deliver in the Senate against the nomination of William Rehnquist to the Supreme Court was on the film, and I specifically was--it was about 20 pages and I asked Mr. Magruder what he wanted me to do with it. He said, let me check, and he did check, and he got back to me and said, Mr. Mitchell would like to see it. So that had to be completely typed and I had to read-I read off the film into an IBM Dictaphone and I believe it was Miss Duncan who typed that, I believe it was she. Senator WEICKER. Miss Duncan now being your secretary, is that correct? Mr. PORTER, Yes, sir. Senator WEICKER. At any time, did you send Miss Duncan to the White House to give Gordon Strachan copies of the photographed documents or the transcripts emanating from those documents? Mr. PORTER. I do not remember, sir, whether I did or not; I do not remember. It is possible, that I did. If I did, it would have been because Mr. Magruder would have said, take a copy of this over to Gordon Strachan. Senator WEICKER. I do want you to think about this answer. Mr. PORTER. I understand. Senator WEICKER. I am not trying to mislead you, and if you care to take a minute or so, just to carefully think about it, please do so. I do not want to rush you. Mr. PORTER. I will tell it as I remember it, and I do-let me say this. Certainly, if Miss Duncan says that that happened, then it did happen. I would not dispute anything that she might say. On the other hand, the only reason that I would send a document over to Mr. Strachan would be at Mr. Magruder's suggestion or direction. I believe that I do remember sending--I believe there was only one copy of the Rehnquist speech put together--I think-it was so long. However, on the item that appeared that was sent to Evans and Novak, I think perhaps that may have been sent over to Mr. Strachan. I just do not remember, Senator. [00.54.53] Senator WEICKER. And you realized at that time that these various documents--well let me rephrase my question. The obtaining of these documents, did you consider them to have been obtained legally or illegally? Mr. PORTER. I remember asking Mr. Rietz. The first question I asked him, I said, "Is this any part of the U.S. mail?" And he said, "No." I knew that, interception intercepting the U.S. mail would be a violation of the law. I put the photographing of a document in the same category as xeroxing a document. If you are taking a picture of it, one way, you are taking a picture of it, another way. So I did not think it was illegal. I thought it was very surreptitious, but I did not, think it was illegal. Senator WEICKER. You thought it was surreptitious? Mr. PORTER. Yes, Sir. Senator WEICKER. But you did not think it was illegal? Mr. PORTER. No, sir. Senator WEICKER. Why, then, did you indicate to your secretary that these, were not matters to be discussed" Mr. PORTER. I think that is, in my opinion, that would be self-evident, Senator Weicker, that you would not go around discussing things like that, the same as you would not go around discussing any kind of information gathering that, you might be doing. Senator WEICKER. Did you indicate to her that if she discussed it, she would be fired? Mr. PORTER. I do not believe I ever made that statement, to her no, sir. Senator WEICKER. Again, let me just ask the question, am I correct in paraphrasing your answer to me that, there might have been an instance where you sent, material to the, White House to Gordon Strachan or am I correct in saying that there were those instances and if so, how many? That is my question. Mr. PORTER. I cannot remember the exact number of instances that I sent things to Mr. Strachan. Mr. Strachan would get copies, addressed to Mr. Haldeman of many things that I did, Senator, in relationship to my primary function at the campaign or the surrogate operation, schedules, and plans--- Senator WEICKER. I understand, but Mr. PORTER. I do not remember--excuse me. Senator WEICKER. Excuse me. Mr. PORTER. I just do not remember specific instances where Mr. Strachan was sent an item here or an item. there. As I say, if Miss Duncan says that, she did, then I would believe, that, But I personally do not remember that specific instance. [00.57.34]
Capitol Journal - Iran/Contra Deal
(01:00:00) WETA logo, PBS funding credits (01:00:12) Captiol Journal opening credits and animation 00:32 Shot opens to tv studio set where four men are seated in a group: show hosts HODDING CARTER and MARK SHIELDS, and guests Senator ALAN SIMPSON and Senator GEORGE MITCHELL (01:01:18) Carter reviews the Iran/Contra events thus far, shot of President RONALD REAGAN and NANCY REAGAN leaving the White House, a Reagan radio address is piped in over a shot of the White House, footage of Senators RICHARD LUGAR and BOB DOLE from appearances on NBC and ABC in which they criticize the White House administration for the Iran/Contra affair, Reagan meets with his cabinet to set up an investigative review of his administration, in a National address Reagan says he is appointing an independent counsel, Republican leaders hold a press conference, Senator ROBERT BYRD recommends further steps for the President, the Senate Intelligence Committee gathers for a private meeting, Vice President GEORGE BUSH defends Reagan's Iran/Contra operations as "leadership", Senator ERNEST HOLLINGS passionately discounts speculation that OLIVER NORTH acted on his own authority (01:05:46) Back in the tv studio panel discusses Reagan's involvement in the affair and what he should now do, how the Democrats feel about this slip up, what it means for Reagan's reputation as President, whether or not Reagan knew about the diversion of funds, the significance of North taking the fifth ammendment, the different committee line ups to investigate the affair (01:18:28) Footage of Bush passionately standing by Reagan, stating that Reagan will tell the truth and the American public will believe him, Senator Hollings criticizes Reagan for the affair (01:19:15) Back in the studio Shields introduces discussion panel - Dr. NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN of the American Enterprise Institute and CHARLES KRAUTHAMMER of the New Republic, about the length and extent of Congressional investigations, the affair's effect on the President's power, the American public's feelings about the affair and Reagan's involvement in it (01:26:58) Shields closes out the show, credits role (01:27:29) PBS funding credits
CONGRESS: WE THE PEOPLE
Shots of a Ways and Means Committee hearing. Newman-these committees deal with key issues of taxes and spending and are coveted assignments. Rep. Bernard Dwyer (D-NJ) says he was the only Freshman on his committee because the other Jersey members worked hard to get him there. Shot of Tip O'Neill in casual meeting with Majority Leader Jim Wright and other committee chairmen. Political Scientist discusses the Committee system and the ascendancies of various committees within Congress. Shot of Tip O'Neill entering House chamber. V.O. discussion of how Committees are divided among parties-the majority party by rule gets heavy majorities in Ways and Means, Appropriations, and Rules. Republicans protested this in 1981. Rep. JIM WRIGHT explains that the majority party needs to control those committees so that it can exercise its responsibility to rule. Newman-these Committees are both instruments of the leadership and training grounds for future Congressional leaders, but some members choose more specialized committees congruent with their own agendas and interests.
Summer of Judgment Pt 1 of 2
MSs Judiciary Committee Chairman PETER RODINO holding gavel aloft, banging the session into order, July 24, 1974. TLSs Judiciary Committee in session. MS Peter Rodino (R- NJ): "We have deliberated. We have been patient. We have been fair. Now the American people, the House of Reps, the Constitution & the whole history of our republic demand that we make up our minds." Edit. "Make no mistake about it, this is a turning point, whatever we decide. Our judgment is not concerned w/ an individual but w/ a system of constitutional government." Panning TLS Rodino Committee. MS/CUs Rep. JIM MANN (D-SC) speaking to committee during debate: "Do you want us to exercise the duty & responsibilty of the power of impeachment, whether that means conviction or exculpation? You know-- Are we so morally bankrupt that you would accept a past course of wrong-doing or that we would decide that the system we have is incapable of sustaining a system of law b/c we aren't perfect?"
Watergate Hearings, June 25, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean
John Dean. I shall now turn to my knowledge of how an intelligence unit was established at the reelection committee. To the best of my recollection, it was the spring of 1971 that Mr. Haldeman discussed with me what my office should do during the forthcoming campaign year. He told me that we should take maximum advantage of the President's incumbency and the focus of everyone in the White House should be on reelecting the President. It was decided that the principal area of concern for my office should be keeping the White House in compliance with the election laws and improving our intelligence regarding demonstrations. I was also told that I should provide legal assistance in establishing the reelection committee and insuring that they had their own capacity to deal with the potential threats of demonstrations during the campaign and particularly the convention. I advised Haldeman that Jack Caulfield was developing security plan and that he wanted to discuss his plan with Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Ehrlichman. I also told him I would seek to get the Interagency Evaluation Committee working on the potential for demonstrations during the campaign and subsequently called Mr. Bernie Wells, the head of the IEC, to my office and told him of the concern of the White House for good intelligence during the coming campaign.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 26, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean.
Fred Thompson, attorney. Do I recall your testimony correctly that you told him that you did not believe the White House could stand a wide-open investigation? John Dean. I told him, we discussed the implications of a wide-open investigation and how embarrassing that could be in an election year. That is correct. Fred Thompson, attorney. Well, did he indicate to you in any way that he would carry out anything less than a wide-open investigation of this matter? John Dean. As I testified yesterday, I don't recall Mr. Peterson saying anything specific. I left the meeting with an impression that Mr. Petersen would be fair in an investigation of the White House. And that that interpretation of fairness would mean that we wouldn't have an investigation of everything that occurred in the White House for 4 years. Fred Thompson, attorney. That was your of the use of the phrase, "wide-open investigation" John Dean. That is correct. Fred Thompson, attorney. I would think a wide-open open investigation would mean a complete thorough investigation of charges that were going around at that time and specifically all of the ramifications of the break-in of the DNC. Do I understand your testimony that you were only concerned that he not go back into the prior 4 years and bring up unrelated matters that had nothing to do with this particular incident? John Dean. I m trying to recall a meeting that was of course, over a year ago and the highlights of my recollection at that point of course are that we discussed what this would mean if this investigation led all the way to the President. I had Fred Thompson, attorney. Pardon me, did you discuss the possibility of Presidential involvement with him? I thought you said yesterday that you had that in your own mind but that you did not discuss it with him at that time. John Dean. I believe I discussed it with Kleindienst and Kleindienst conveyed my concern to Mr. Petersen and it s very possible that it was reraised again when Mr. Petersen and I departed Mr. Kleindienst's office. I do recall the note that the meetings ended on that I hoped that my fears suspecting the worst were not true.