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Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 27, 1973 (1/2)
[00.17.37-Sen. INOUYE continues to confront DEAN with a WHITE HOUSE memorandum-The memo exemplifies the White House's "BLAME IT ALL ON DEAN" STRATEGY] Senator INOUYE. [QUOTING FROM THE WHITE HOUSE MEMORANDUM] "It was Dean who suggested to General Walters on January 26 that CIA pay the Watergate defendants while in jail," this is from the, Walters memorandum for record June 28, 1972. Mr. DEAN. I believe I have explained that, Senator, in that I reported also at one point in time, to Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Mardian about the Gray theory. That theory Prompted Mr. Mardian, as I recall, to suggest that the CIA might be of some assistance in providing us support and he also raised the question that the CIA might have a very Proper reason to do so because of the fact that these were former CIA operatives. Mr. Mitchell asked me to go back and explore this to Mr. Haldeman and Ehrlichman knowing very well that this isn't the sort of thing I could go to the CIA with. I didn't talk to Mr. Haldeman about this, rather I talked to Mr. Ehrlichman about it and he told me indeed I should explore it. In fact, I said I didn't know anybody with the CIA. He told me--I told him I didn't know Mr. Helms. He told me not to call Helms but to call General Walters, General Walters is a friend of the White House, and at that time alluded to the fact that he had already met -with General Walters. Senator INOUYE. Did you, in fact, discuss this matter with General Walters? Mr. DEAN. Yes, I did and I have so testified.] [00.19.10] Senator INOUYE. [READING W.H. MEMORANDUM] "It was Dean purportedly acting on behalf of Mitchell who came, to Ehrlichman several weeks after the break-in to obtain approval for fund raising by Kalmbach for the arrested persons," and this is from Mr. Ehrlichman. Mr. DEAN. It is correct that Mr.--after the fact that there could be, no assistance from the, CIA came out, and Haldeman and Ehrlichman agreed that they couldn't and I reported that back to Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Mardian, that the demands apparently had reached the point where, they felt they had to do something to get some money and they had none themselves. I was asked again by Mr. Mitchell to go back and raise this with Mr. Haldeman and Ehrlichman. [00.19.59] Mr. Mitchell told me, that he believed that Mr. Ehrlichman particularly would have an interest in making sure, that these men were taken care of, and it did not take me any persuading at all in this conversation with Mr. Haldeman and Ehrlichman to initiate Mr. Kalmbach, and obviously Mr. Kalmbach would not have acted on my instructions at all. Senator INOUYE. [QUOTING W.H. MEMORANDUM] "It was Dean -who reviewed the papers found in Hunt's safe and declared that they were politically sensitive' and should be given special treatment." [00.20.34] Mr. DEAN. I don't think, there was any doubt about the political sensitivity. Mr. Ehrlichman, as you recall, on the 19th, there was a meeting in Mr. Ehrlichman's office late that evening. Mr. Colson is the, one who had expressed anxiety over -what might, be in Mr. Hunt's safe. As I have also testified at a subsequent time I learned that apparently Mr. Colson and Mr. Hunt had talked about the fact, that there, were things in his safe that somebody at the White House should take possession of. It was during this meeting in Mr. Ehrlichman's office on the 19th that Mr. Ehrlichman said that I should report back to him the contents of the safe after he had directed Mr. Kehrli to have the safe, opened. [00.21.17] Senator INOUYE. What do you think Mr. Ehrlichman meant by "should be given special treatment"? Mr. DEAN. Well, I don't know what Mr. Ehrlichman meant by it. I know that Mr. Ehrlichman, when I described the documents to him, realized their political sensitivity, and that, they--he had originally told me, when I reported what the documents were to shred them and it was subsequently he, told me to "deep six" the briefcase and shred the documents and it was only after I had reached the conclusion in my own mind that, I wasn't going to do that, and I persuaded him that at too many people had seen them, that that, might be what he reefers to as special treatment, they be given directly to Mr. Gray. Senator ERVIN. We will take a recess for another vote. [Recess.] [00.22.13-LEHRER v.o. states the committee has gone to the Senate Floor for another vote] [00.22.22-LEHRER in studio] [PBS network ID-title screen "SENATE HEARINGS ON CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES"] [00.25.48-LEHRER reintroduces INOUYE'S questioning] [00.25.55]
Lawmakers April 28 1983
Panel of House Foreign Affairs Committee. Panel of Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Panel of Senate Appropriations Committee.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 26, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean.
Senator Joseph Montoya (D New Mexico). Then do I understand you to say that, there are briefing papers for every press conference by Mr. Ziegler and for every press conference by the President available at the White House? John Dean. Yes, sir. Every time Mr. Ziegler gives a briefing it is recorded by a court reporter type of situation and that is kept in record form and those are distributed to various members of the White House staff. But again, I have not had access to get back to these. Senator Joseph Montoya (D New Mexico). Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask you and counsel to subpoena these briefings, the briefing papers, so that they will become available to this committee. Samuel Dash, attorney. Yes. Senator Montoya, we are in the process of getting them.
Capitol Journal - House Panel Symposium on Bipartisanship
Panel on the changing role of Parties and Partisanship in Congress, as part of symposium on the 200th anniversary of Congress; U.S. Representatives Tom Foley (D-WA), Howard Berman (D-CA), and Robert Michel (R-IL), former Congressmen Barber Conable and Richard White. Congressman Berman: "Mr. Conable and then Mr. White is gonna have the proverbial last shot." Conable: "I don't have anything that relevant to what we were just talking about, but one interesting element to competitive partisanship that I thought was quite instructive. In 1969, Gerald Ford came to me and said, 'It's time something was done about the mindless operation of the seniority rule in this Congress, and the Republicans have got to do it. The Democrats have the majority in House and they've got the weight of the world on their shoulders. They're making the real decisions, and it's very difficult for them to do. Second, they have the seniority problem. The people have pruned away our dead wood, historically. Poor, old feeble Democrats, a lot of them get returned to office without any effort, so they've got a seniority problem. And third, they have a diversity problem that we don't have. Unless the Democrats can go through the Chairs on the way from-- and hopefully, this is going to continue-- Whip to Majority Leader to Speaker, they get into terrible fights. And that wouldn't happen if they changed the seniority rule in some way that resulted in them having to choose their committee leaders. So the Republicans have got to take the lead.' And in 1969, our task force, which I chaired, came up with the plan that, four years later, was adopted by the Democrats, and it meant a lot more to them than it did to us because they had the seniority problem. So they ceremoniously beheaded several committee chairmen while all we did was give legitimacy to our leaders. But if we hadn't been willing to exercise partisan leadership on that, it would have been very difficult for the Democrats to be dragged, kicking and screaming, into changing the seniority system. Because that was the price, at that point, that the South had for staying in the Democratic Party. And they had to do it as a competitive matter. Partisanship can have a creative effect on a body like ours. And so, partisanship isn't, per-say, bad. The competition of the parties, if it's real competition, is very likely to make for a more vital institution." Former U.S. Representative Richard C. White taking notes and listening.
CONGRESS: WE THE PEOPLE
WETA "CONGRESS: WE THE PEOPLE" IN 12.22.18-WETA credit/funding credit/title sequence 12.23.02-Shots of the NIXON INAUGURATION, Tricky Dick takes oath of office. Interspersed with shots of House Judiciary Committee Counsel reading the preamble of an ARTICLE OF IMPEACHMENT which accuses NIXON of violating his oath of office to uphold the laws. Host Ed Newman-IMPEACHMENT is the ultimate check that the Congress has against the Executive Branch, initiated only twice [as of 1984, thanks, Ken Starr!] against a President. Newman identifies the desk he's sitting on as Nixon's Oval Office Desk, now in the President's room near the Senate chamber, points out that Nixon sealed his fate by rigging the desk with recording microphones. Impeachment proceedings against NIXON exemplify the system of separation of powers in the Constitution. 12.24.38-Titles show the procedures of impeachment: House majority vote to impeach any official, 2/3 vote by Senate to convict and remove from office. Political Scientist says that Impeachment is rare and difficult to achieve. Illustration of the Congress during Andrew Johnson impeachment debates. Portrait, early photo, of Johnson. Illustration of JOHN WILKES BOOTH assassinating LINCOLN. Cartoons depicting JOHNSON'S conflict with Radical Republicans over Reconstruction policy. Shot of the Article of Impeachment delivered against Andrew Johnson. Illustration of the Senate Impeachment trial. V.O.-seven Republicans voted to acquit Johnson, who escaped removal by one vote. 12.26.01-Shot of NIXON addressing Congress. Former Rep. CHARLES WIGGINS (R-CA), member of the Judiciary Committee who voted against impeaching Nixon, describes the conflict between the two branches, as a longstanding feeling that the President was taking too much power from Congress. Still of NIXON making a pretty goofy face. Still of NIXON supporters as Dick and Pat ride in a convertible limo in inaugural parade. Stills of NIXON in meetings with Congressmen. V.O.-NIXON'S clashes with Congress were powerful. Shots of Washington Post headlines about WATERGATE. Political scientist says that Watergate might not have led to Impeachment if NIXON hadn't already antagonized Congress by impounding funds appropriated by the Congress. 12.27.21-Rep. PETER RODINO, chair of Judiciary Committee that impeached Nixon, discusses NIXON'S transgressions against Congress' power, Congress generally letting him get away with it. Rep. WIGGINS says arguments made after the fact disguise Congress' complicity through previous administrations. Host Newman-WATERGATE drove Congress to challenge NIXON, leading to the appointment of the ERVIN COMMITTEE. Shot of SAM ERVIN chairing the Senate Committee. Shot of head White House goon JOHN EHRLICHMAN testifying. Shot of White House aide Alexander Butterfield testifying to reveal the existence of the TAPE RECORDING SYSTEM in the White House, which was the nail in NIXON'S coffin. Headline from Washington Post about Nixon's refusal to turn over tapes, firing of the Special Prosecutor. V.O.-These abuses led Congress to call for impeachment. RODINO says the "Saturday Night Massacre" made it clear that NIXON was going to use his power to evade the law. 12.29.54
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 28, 1973 (1/2)
[00.18.28-MacNEILL in studio] MacNEILL states that BAKER is asking about DEAN'S meetings with NIXON after the break-in [PBS network ID-title screen "SENATE HEARINGS ON CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES"] [00.22.00-MacNEILL] MacNEILL states BAKER will continue to ask about the September 15, 1972 Oval Office meeting [00.22.12-BAKER gavels meeting open] Senator BAKER. The committee will come, to order. The chairman was necessarily called away for the rest of the afternoon. For the information of the committee, I might indicate that he requested that we run as long as practical, and that we continue, with present, rotation arrangements, so as soon as I can conclude my queries I will yield then to Senator Montoya and after that to Senator Weicker. Mr. Dean, do you have, any objection if we try to go, say, until a few minutes before 6 tonight? Mr. DEAN. I will hold up as long as I can, Senator Senator BAKER. If you need a -break or would like to break in the course of things, if you would let me know I would be happy to do that. Senator BAKER. Mr. Dean, have we finished with the delineation of the September 15 meeting? [00.23.17] Mr. DEAN. -No. I do not believe we have. We were discussing the fact that we were talking about how to deal with the Patman committee because this was another threat, a dual threat, I might add, First was the fact that, it would mean adverse publicity as a result of the hearings and Second, there was always the potential they might stumble onto something there. Senator BAKER. Were those words used? Mr. DEAN. I believe, when we talked about, adverse Publicity and there is no telling where this thing may go. Senator BAKER. Do you remember who said that ? Mr. DEAN. I said that. Senator BAKER. Do you remember what the President's reaction was? Mr. DEAN-. Well. he asked me, who was covering the hearings and I told him that Dick- Cook was covering the hearings. Senator BAKER. Covering meaning what person on the White House staff had responsibility for that? Mr. DEAN. Yes, that is correct. Because I explained to him that Mr. Cook had formerly worked for the House Banking and Currency Committee, and at that point he said that Mr. Timmons should get on top of those hearings. [00.24.30-related to ENEMIES LIST activities] We then, the conversation turned to the press coverage that had been following the Watergate incident, and during this discussion he told me that I should keep a good list of people who were giving us trouble in the press because we would give them trouble after the election. Senator BAKER. This was stated by the President? Mr. DEAN. That is correct. [00.25.00]
Watergate Impeachment Hearings House Judiciary Committee, July 29, 1974. Joseph Maraziti (R - New Jersey).
Peter Rodino (D - New Jersey). The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Maraziti is recognized. Joseph Maraziti (R New Jersey). Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We see here the sharp differences in the interpretation of the facts and the law in this matter. Mr. Chairman, I submit that we have these sharp differences because the case and the evidence is not clear and convincing against the President. Specific allegations are not set forth and the proponents of the resolution to impeach continue to refuse to set up these specific allegations in the articles.
Watergate Impeachment Hearings House Judiciary Committee, July 29, 1974. Joseph Maraziti (R - New Jersey).
Joseph Maraziti (R New Jersey). We have theories propounded that the President should be held accountable for the acts of his subordinates even though he had no knowledge and did not authorize certain acts. A great deal has been said and in fact, proven, that this staff member did this and that staff member did that, and these staff members in concert did this and did that. But Chairman I submit to you that the proof fails and fails in a very vital respect when it fails to draw the line to the President of the United States.
Watergate Impeachment Hearings House Judiciary Committee, July 29, 1974. Joseph Maraziti (R - New Jersey).
Joseph Maraziti (R New Jersey). Now on the question of wiretapping that we have heard so much about. And without going into details because it has been thoroughly discussed, what do we really have here? We have heard the urgent pleas by Mr. Henry Kissinger to stop the leaks from the National Security Council. Mr. Chairman, these pleadings were, made not, just by an ordinary individual that might not have had the knowledge or information necessary to appreciate the seriousness of the situation, but no less a man than Henry Kissinger who in my opinion would be the highest authority in the land as to whether or not leaks would affect the security of the United States. And what do we have here in response to that plea? The President in pursuance of his Constitutional duty, his Constitutional duty to protect the United States, ordered the wiretaps and stopped the leaks. And as I said in my previous remarks today, I for one, Mr. Chairman, would on the basis of Henry Kissinger making a request, if Mr. Nixon refused to take this action to protect the United States by ordering these wiretaps, I for or one would vote to impeach him for that refusal of his Constitutional duty and responsibility.
Watergate Impeachment Hearings House Judiciary Committee, July 29, 1974. Joseph Maraziti (R - New Jersey).
Joseph Maraziti (R New Jersey). In closing, Mr. Chairman, let me say that I think that I ought to give some serious consideration to exactly what we are doing here. Mr. Richard Nixon was elected by 47 million people of these United States to be the President of the United States and from what I have heard and what I have heard today I cannot and will not bring myself to remove, to vote to remove that choice of 47 million people and impeach Richard Nixon, the President of the United States. Mr. Chairman, if I have any time left I yield the balance of my time to Mr. Latta. Peter Rodino (D - New Jersey). The gentleman has 30 seconds remaining.
Watergate Impeachment Hearings House Judiciary Committee, July 29, 1974. Elizabeth Holtzman (D - New York).
Elizabeth Holtzman (D New York). And what about the Ellsberg case? Perhaps the President didn't authorize the burglary in the first place but according to Ehrlichman he ratified it afterwards. And if it were such a horrendous crime in the President's eyes, then why didn't he expose the people who were responsible to the criminal authorities? No, he covered it up. And he said that Ehrlichman, who has since been convicted for that break in, or being involved in that, was one of the two finest public servants he had ever known.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities - Testimony of Robert Odle.
Senator Sam ERVIN (D-NC). Mr. Odle I have a question or two. You stated this morning that G. Gordon Liddy and Jeb Stuart Magruder were not on the best of terms. Mr. ODLE. Yes sir that was my impression. Senator ERVIN. Do you know what was the cause of the lack of good will? Mr. ODLE. Well, I can give you one reason and a probably not that important. But, I moved Mr. Liddy's office at one point from the fourth floor to the eighth floor. And Mr. Liddy very vigorously objected to that and tried to get me to change it, and I said I'm just not going to do that, I can't, I need the space. And he appealed that to Mr. Magruder, and Mr. Magruder said I don't want to get involved in office space with Odle, whatever Odle says about office space is what I'm gonna do. And they had a number of serious battles about the location of Mr. Liddy's office. I don't, I mean that's just one example. I think that Mr. Liddy was a little bit older than Mr. Magruder and possibly didn't like working for a younger man, but that's speculation on my part. Senator ERVIN. Now, you spoke this morning about a shredder. Mr. ODLE. Yes sir. Senator ERVIN. A shredder is a machine that's used to destroy document documentary matters in such a way that like Humpty Dumpty they can't be put back together again, isn't that so? Mr. ODLE. Yes sir it is. Senator ERVIN. And it's used for to destroy useless papers, and it's also used to destroy papers which the destroyer wishes to have concealed from identification and reading isn't it? Mr. ODLE. Well, I would suppose so. It was used primarily during the campaign so that people wouldn't come into our offices and maybe co-op the cleaning crew. You know that happened in the '68 campaign to the Nixon campaign in that very same building. A columnist in Washington came in and talked to the cleaning people and said "We would like your waste paper" and so that was just one way of seeing that that columnist didn't get our waste paper. Senator ERVIN. Yes, in other words you didn't want the general public, the purpose of a shredder is to make it certain that the documents cannot come to the attention, the contents of the document cannot come to the attention of anyone who might be interested outside the organization in reading those documents. Mr. ODLE. I would think that would be a fair statement, especially those people who at that time we were running against. Senator ERVIN. Now, ordinarily the purpose of a document is to preserve a record of what the document records, isn't it? Mr. ODLE. I would suppose so. Senator ERVIN. And um, what is the purpose of making a record and then destroying that record? Mr. ODLE. Well sir, I don't know that there was. I would think that the basic purpose of the, of that shredding machine we were talking about was to pick up the waste paper in the evening and not the documents. You know, let me just say one thing, um we tried from the beginning to save documents. Because, we thought this campaign was, despite these other situations, was a fairly organized, well run, fairly efficient campaign. That seems funny now, I know, but we did think that. (courtroom laughs) And we wanted to save the documents 'cause we thought it might be interesting for a scholar to look back at a hundred years..... (courtroom laughs, applauds, clapping) (Senator Ervin hits gavel several times, to bring the courtroom to order) Mr. ODLE. I can only tell you of our intention, I in light of recent events that might appear funny, but I think the point I'm making you'll find interesting. So, we did save documents senator, we saved many of them. And do you know right now there are fifteen hundred cubic feet of committee documents that have been available at various times to the United States Attorney, the FBI, the grand jury, Common Cause, the Democratic National Committee, and the Senate Select Committee. And we've been working with all of those committees and panels and making those documents available. So, the thing that did not happen, after the election was that we took all those documents and shredded them. We took them all, and put them all together and they're housed in one location right now, pretty much and they're there. And they were not shredded and they were not destroyed.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 14, 1973 - Jeb Magruder
U.S. Senator Lowell Weicker (R-CT): "In other words, attitudes that were prevalent in the White House and brought over to the Committee To Re-Elect the President." Deputy Director of the Committee to Re-Elect the President (CREEP) Jeb Magruder: "That's correct." Senator Weicker: "I just would then like to make my parting shot in the commendation to you because I think you really squared this on that one, that I don't know who in governmental sense thought that the Constitution of the United States wasn't up to it. I don't know who thought that in an election sense the American people weren't up to it, but would you say at this point in time that, left alone, those things will work pretty well? They don't have to be added to?" Magruder: "I could not agree more with you, Senator, now." Senate Select Committee members seated in row: Sen. Weicker, Senator Edward Gurney (R-FL), Minority Counsel Fred Thompson, Senator Howard Baker (R-TN), Senator and Committee Chairman Sam Ervin (D-NC), and Majority Counsel Samuel Dash; adult Caucasian male staffers seated in BG, adult Caucasian press and photographers in FG. Sen. Ervin recognizes U.S. Senator Herman Talmadge (D-GA). Sen Talmadge: "Mr. Magruder, you have been forthright and candid in testimony before this committee and I congratulate you it. I was handed a book written by Woodrow Wilson, 'The New Freedom,' during the noon hour, written in 1913, 60 years ago, and I think two quotations from that book are particularly in order at this point. I read from page 111, chapter six: 'Let There Be Light.' 'The concern of patriotic men is to put our Government again on its right basis by substituting the popular will for the rule of gaudiness, the processes of common counsel for those of private arrangement. In order to do this, a first necessity is to open the doors and let in the light on all affairs which the people have a right to know about. In the first place, it is necessary to open up all of the processes of our politics. They have been too secret, too complicated, too roundabout, they have consisted too much of private conferences and secret understandings.' Then on page 113: 'If there is nothing to conceal, then why conceal it? If it's a public game, why play it in private? If it is a public game, then why not come out in the open and play it in public?' Don't you find that passage particularly appropriate in light of today's problems with which we are confronted?" Magruder: "I would agree with you, Senator."
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 5, 1973
[00.22.11] Senator MONTOYA. Did you during the month of 'May, or during the early part of June, type any memorandum -with respect to Democratic national headquarters or the McGovern headquarters? Mrs. HARMONY. You are speaking of prior to the break-in" Senator MONTOYA. Yes. Mrs. HARMONY. No, senator, not that I am aware of. Senator MONTOYA. You mentioned that you had some pictures supposedly the Democratic National Committee with Committee with some fingers on them. Did that not indicate to you that they came from the national committee? Mrs. HARMONY. No, Senator, I did not know where they had come from. Senator MONTOYA. And you did not type any memo whatsoever before the break-in? Mrs. HARMONY. Yes, memorandums that I have mentioned to you before that I had received from Senator McGovern's headquarters Senator MONTOYA. You have indicated a very hazy memory, Mrs. Harmony, about the contents of the memorandum which you typed, did you--see if you can recall--did you type any memorandum with respect to anything at Democratic national headquarters or McGovern headquarters prior to the break-in in June? Mrs. HARMONY. Senator, only the memorandums that I have mentioned are the only ones that I can remember. I will say this. I did take dictation from Mr. Liddy. As any secretary may be aware, the first word will not relate to the third, you only take down, words. When you type it you only type words, so if you do not read it for content you do not remember the content. Senator MONTOYA. Well, what were the memorandums with respect to the Democratic National Committee about, how closely tied to the national committee, what was it? Mrs. HARMONY. Senator, I do not know which memorandum you are referring to. Senator MONTOYA. I am referring to any memorandums that you might have typed prior to the break-in with respect to the. Democratic National Committee or the McGovern headquarters. Mrs, HARMONY. Prior to the break-in I typed some general intelligence memorandums. One had to do with the subject of Robert Cranston, one had to do with the status of the McGovern workers in the headquarters, one was a, list of typewritten names of the workers in the McGovern headquarters, and the other two were the tapes that we have talked about. This is all I can recall doing. Senator MONTOYA. And how did the pictures of Mr. O'Brien and others get to Mr. Liddy's desk, and did you ask any questions about A those or do you have any recollection as to why they got there? Mrs. HARMONY. I have no idea how they got to his desk. I did not" see them brought into the office at all. I do not know what disposition was made of them. Senator MONTOYA. What happened to the files which you took for, Mr. Liddy to your apartment? Mrs. HARMONY. Mr. Liddy, came by and picked them up. Senator MONTOYA. Since the break-in who have you talked to among the individuals 'involved in, this, from the White House and including Mr. Magruder and any others from the Department Of Justice? Who have you talked to about this case? Mrs. HARMONY. I have been interviewed by the FBI. Senator MONTOYA. Did you talk to Mr. Dean about this case? Mrs. HARMONY, NO, I do not know Mr. Dean. Senator MONTOYA. Did you talk to the attorney for the Committee To Re-Elect the President, Mr. O'Brien? Mrs. HARMONY. Yes, before my grand jury appearance, Yes I have had conversations with Mr. O'Brien. I think everyone who went to the grand jury probably did. Senator MONTOYA. Did you talk to Mr. Liddy? Mrs. HARMONY. Concerning this? Senator MONTOYA. Yes, concerning your grand jury appearance before, this committee, or either. Mrs. HARMONY. No, I do not think I have discussed anything about my grand jury appearance with Mr. Liddy or about, appearing before the Hill, no. Senator MONTOYA. That is all, Mr. Chairman. Senator ERVIN. Mrs. Harmony, when did you deliver an envelope to Mrs. E. Howard Hunt which you believed contained money? Mrs. HARMONY. I delivered an envelope to Mr. E. Howard Hunt Senator ERVIN. When was, that was that. before or after the break-in? Mrs. HARMONY. That was before, sir. It would have been the week of April 7, I would say probably the 4th or 5th of April. Mr. Liddy was traveling at that time. Senator ERVIN. Now, how often did you deliver envelopes to E. Howard Hunt? Mrs. HARMONY. That was the only time. Senator ERVIN. You say that Mr. Liddy reported to 'Mr. Stans' and to Mr. Magruder? Mrs. HARMONY. Mr. Liddy, when he was counsel to the finance committee, reported directly to Mr. Stans' in that capacity. Senator ERVIN. And he stated to you virtually every, day that, he was going to see Mr. Stans' Mrs. HARMONY. 'Mr. Stans had at staff meeting every morning. Senator ERVIN. Had a, staff meeting every morning attended by Mr. LIDDY? Mrs. HARMONY, Yes, sir. [00.27.56]
Lawmakers May 3 1984
House Banking Committee in hearing. Bankers in audience of Committee hearing.
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee Hearings on Presidential Campaign Activities, May 17, 19
Senator WEICKER. Alright. Now, in conversations that you had with staff members of this committee, you've indicated and you've also indicated on the chart, correct me if I'm wrong, that there are basically five assistants to the President who reported directly to him. These men were John Ehrlichman, Bob Haldeman, Henry Kissinger, Clark MacGregor, and Peter Flannigan. Is that correct? Mr. KEHRLI. That's right. Senator WEICKER. And that you also indicated that Presidential Counselors Robert Finch and Donald Rumsfeld also reported directly to the President, but did not have specific operational responsabilities in the White House. Mr. KEHRLI. That's correct. Senator WEICKER. Isn't it true that the only people who had direct access to the President were Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman and Doctor Kissinger and that other people including Clark MacGregor and Peter Flannigan, Finch, Rumsfeld (unclear) saw the president, but only at the sufferance of one of these three men? Mr. KEHRLI. No, I would say that if they wanted to see the President, then a time would be set up based on the Presidents schedule and the presidents priorities, and that was something that Mr. Haldeman was aware of and was able to set up. On the other hand, the President at any time may have called for them or anybody else on the staff. Senator WEICKER. But, if the initiation of this contact was made by any of these individuals, they would have to go through one of these three that I've mentioned, Kissinger, Ehrlichman, or Haldeman. Mr. KEHRLI. They would go to Mr. Haldeman, to see what the president's schedule was in terms of time. Obviously, his time was more important than theirs, and in order to make sure that there was time available to see him, then they would go to Mr. Haldeman. Senator WEICKER. In other words, do you consider as a practical matter, Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Kissinger, Mr. Ehrlichman, Clark MacGregor, Peter Flannigan, Finch and Rumsfeld equals in so far as access to the President is concerned? Mr. KEHRLI. I wouldn't call them equals as far as access to the President. No, because each of them had different needs to see the president. The nature of Bob's, of Mr. Haldeman's job was such that he saw the president quite often. The nature of Mr. Rumsfelds and Mr. Finch's job was such that they didn't need to see the president that often, they didn't request to see the president that often. Senator WEICKER. Did Mr., Dr. Kissinger go through Mr. Haldeman? Mr. KEHRLI. I don't think so, and I can't say that for a fact.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 7, 1973
[00.17.22] Mr. SLOAN. The political committee essentially working with the, guidelines we gave them, for instance, if you are talking about a, $40 million campaign, each of the various differentials would begin the process by indicating the tasks they wanted to accomplish and how much their thought it would cost. The process within these meetings would be to review- these in total and totals might come in at $60 million and subsequent discussions would generally be along the line: where did you cut, where do we establish our priorities, how do we get all of the individual departments and divisions so they fall within the ceiling set by the finance committee in terms of total dollars expected to be raised. We subsequently were in the process which we had not completed at the time I left of setting up a monitoring function where we would report back to the various divisions on essentially a monthly basis as to how they were doing versus the funds they Were allowed within their budgets. Senator INOUYE. SO in your budget committee discussions you discussed the purposes for which these funds were to be used? Mr. SLOAN. In broad categories. There would be, for instance, in considering the advertising budget, the members of that department, would come in, essentially make a presentation and say our judgment is we should allocate 60 percent of this money for television, 10 percent for radio and so forth. But generally, to these kinds of dimensions there would often be discussion of whether that is the proper allocations in terms of percentages and so forth. Senator INOUYE. Would the disbursement of 81 million qualify for discussion in these meetings? Mr. SLOAN. I believe it should have, I never heard any of these funds listed here ever discussed in, any budget. Senator INOUYE, Did you ever discuss clandestine activities? Mr. SLOAN. No, sir, I never heard any such discussion. Senator INOUYE. Was it the practice of your budget committee to dispense $300,000 or a $1.7 million without your knowing what the purpose was to be? Mr. SLOAN. As I indicated, Senator these funds and the, authority that was set up to disburse them was never a subject of any budget committee meeting in which I sat. I did not sit in all of them'. Senator INOUYE. You just took it on face value That it was to be spent for legal purposes. Mr. SLOAN. Absolutely. Senator INOUYE. Never got suspicious? Mr. SLOAN. Not at the time I was doing it, Certainly, following June 17, yes, sir. Senator INOUYE Did your office, the White House and Internal Revenue Service ever get together to discuss how the laws of the United States, the tax laws of the United States would be skirted to raise funds such as, for example, avoiding payment of capital gains taxes? Mr. SLOAN. There were discussions, I am not sure quite the context you presented, Senator. Opinions on the subject of capital gains liability were sought from various legal sources independent as well as, I believe there were opinions probably from counsel in the White House at early stages since we did not have a full-time counsel ourselves. With regard to the other matters, for instance, the gift tax liability to donors, I believe both our Party as well as the Democratic Party were urging, I believe, cooperatively an attempt to reverse the decision to get some kind of a decision that would do away from the necessity of these multiple committees which are real headaches and nightmares for people involved in the mechanical end of fundraising. Senator INOUYE. I have here a draft letter prepared by Mr. Thomas Pike, cochairman of the California Committee To Re-Elect the President dent. It is a draft letter which is addressed to you, sir. It is a form letter that one would fill out when he wishes to contribute stocks and securities. Mr. SLOAN. Yes, sir. Senator INOUYE. Did you receive any stocks and securities? Mr. SLOAN. Yes, sir; we received a very large proportion, particularly, in the pre-April 7 period, of our receipts in the form of securities. Senator INOUYE. What was the scheme, sir? Mr. SLOAN, Excuse me, sir? Senator INOUYE. What was the scheme involved? Mr. SLOAN. The. scheme, sir? Senator INOUYE. Yes. Mr. SLOAN. I do not believe there was any scheme. I think in terms of fundraising, anything that is of value essentially can be accepted into a campaign. Securities, as far as I know, certainly not in the magnitude or quantity that existed normally in a Presidential campaign, have been handled by finance committees regularly. For instance, when I was with the Republican National Committee, there would be contributions in the form of securities. [00.22.47]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 28, 1973 (2/2)
[01.23.07-INOUYE reads the closing statement from the WHITE HOUSE-prepared interrogatory of DEAN.] Senator INOUYE. "A central credibility question is what prompted Dean's tactics in March and April of 1973. The desire to have the truth or the effort to achieve-" Senator ERVIN. Senator, so the record will be correct, is that a statement which White, House counsel has prepared? Senator INOUYE. This is a statement prepared by Mr. J. Fred Buzhardt. Senator ERVIN. Yes. Senator INOUYE. Special counsel to the President. Senator ERVIN. And it is a, statement of his contentions about evidence and not evidence as such. Mr. DEAN. May I ask a question? Does this represent the White House view or "Mr. Buzhardt's view? Senator INOUYE. This was delivered to me yesterday under cover letter signed by Mr. J. Fred Buzhardt. [QUOTING WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT] [01.23.58] "A central credibility question is: 'What prompted Dean's tactics in March and April 1973-- the desire to have the, truth told or the effort to achieve immunity from prosecution? The following sequence, of events is important:" Dean's admitted -personal connection -with 'the offer of clemency to McCord in January (Dean to Caulfield to McCord via. Ulasewicz) (p. 141). Dean's admitted personal connection with Hunt's demand for more money on March 19 (Hunt to O'Brien to Dean) (p. (p. 197). Dean's meeting with the President on March 21-22. On any version of this meeting it was an effort to get the President to take action on what was becoming a personal problem for Dean. (P. 195). McCord's letter to Judge Sirica on march 23. [01.24.45] Mr. DEAN. May 'I just comment there? Senator INOUYE. Please do, sir. Mr. DEAN. I, in the 21st meeting, had hoped that that would be the truth punctuation point that ended the coverup. It -was after that, that morning meeting when I saw that it was not- going to end that the period had not been placed in the story that my whole thinking began to change and I began to think of how can I now proceed while others are unwilling to proceed, particularly Mr. Haldeman and -Mr. Ehrlichman, and at that, point in time I certainly wanted to try to still get the President out in front of this entire matter. [01.25.30] Senator INOUYE. [reading]: [QUOTING FROM WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT] McCord's letter to Judge Sirica on March 23. This was the crucial break in the cover-up. 'Dean learned via a call from O'Brien (p. 205). On March 25 press comments directly linked Dean with knowledge of the Watergate break-in (p. 203). He called Liddy's attorney, Maroulis on March 27 to get a statement that he did not have prior knowledge of break-in (p. 211). Maroulis called back on March 29 with word that he couldn't give him a statement (p. 1212). This statement might have been taped. On March 28 and March 29 he solicited names of Criminal counsel (p. 220). On March 30, he decided to retain Mr. Shaffer (p. 220). Time had run out; the coverup had come apart; Dean was centrally involved. he sent his lawyers to the U.S. Attorney on Monday, April 2, and commenced his negotiations for immunity. [01.26.32] Senator INOUYE. Mr. Chairman, this ends the statement. Senator ERVIN. Thank you. Senator INOUYE. Mr. Chairman., I have questions of my own but these questions have taken up an hour and 15 minutes so, if I may, I would like to have the opportunity at some later time, to interrogate. Senator ERVIN. Yes, all the members of the committee will be accorded a second opportunity. Senator INOUYE. I thank- you very much. Thank you, Mr. Dean. Senator ERVIN. Do you want to respond to the statement which has just been read to you ? [01.27.00] Mr. DEAN. I believe I have commented through -the, questions and through answers to most of those matters. The fact, I would just make, this point. I would recall the fact that the question of clemency for Mr. McCord was a result of the fact that the issue, of clemency had come up directly with the President. That was not something that I initiated. It was something that came in. Mr. Colson went to Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Ehrlichman, in turn went to the President, Mr. Colson also went to the President, I received word that the fact that clemency had been offered to one, similar assurances should be given or could be given to all, so that is 'clearly in the record on the clemency matter. [01.27.48-DEAN explains again the March 21 meeting with NIXON] The, 21st meeting I have explained repeatedly what my hope in accomplishing with that meeting was, and my disappointment when I had thought I did have access to the President. I thought what I call my cancer on the Presidency speech did not result In immediate surgery but rather continued coverup. [01.28.15]
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 27, 1973
[00.22.22-DEAN continues to introduce documents about the existence of the White House ENEMIES LIST] Mr. DEAN. The next is a memorandum from a member of Mr. Colson's staff that is part, of one of many memorandums that came in. this one is dated June 28, where there was a continual updating of the opponents list. Mr. DEAN. And the last document is one relating to the McGovern campaign staff with asterisks beside certain key names that, were to be included in the opponents project also. Mr. DEAN. And that is the sum and substance of the request that I have, available that, Mr. Weicker asked me for yesterday. Mr. DASH. Mr. Dean. can we have those? They will be marked. and we 'Will make copies of them for members of the committee and circulate them to members of the, committee. Senator ERVIN. Let the reporter mark them with the appropriate numbers. I would just like to say I am sorry, I misconstrued Mr. Buzhardt's questions, they were just handed to me before I looked at them, and they were separate from the, other questions, The other questions were clearly directed to the witness and not to the, committee. The Chair now recognizes the Senator from Florida, Mr. Gurney. [00.23.52-Sen. GURNEY begins to question DEAN, clearly trying to discredit DEAN.] Senator GURNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Mr. Dean. Mr. DEAN. Good morning, Senator GURNEY. We have had a great deal of testimony, 245 pages of your statement as well as the testimony yesterday, and I must say it hard to know -where to begin in all this. I will go over some of the ground that has already been covered, in an effort perhaps to clarify and amplify as far as I am concerned. I will ask probing questions and I am sure, you recognize why tins is important. There have, been serious charges in the testimony leveled against many people, including the President, of the United States. Some of these charges, uncorroborated. Certainly the duty of this committee is to seek out the, truth, to gather all the evidence we can from every witness and especially from you who probably will be the most, important witness in these whole hearings. As a matter of fact, I think the committee, would be very derelict if it didn't get all the evidence it could. I think probably the best, place to start always is at the beginning. [00.25.13-attempt to make WATERGATE out to be the freelance doings of LIDDY] Would you say that it, is 'fair to say that Gordon Liddy's plan of bugging and electronic espionage really started out the whole, Watergate affair? Mr. DEAN. Would I say it, started off the whole Watergate affair? Senator GURNEY. Yes. Mr. DEAN. Well, as I testified I think that the--there was an atmosphere that might have been several precursors source to that plan. The plan was an accident of fate where they culminated into Mr. Liddy's specific proposal that, was presented in the Attorney General office in the two meetings which occurred in late January and early, February. Senator GURNEY. But as far as the Watergate break-in itself is concerned it, really stemmed from Mr. Liddy's plan of bugging and electronic espionage, did it, not? Mr. DEAN. The, specific plan to enter the Watergate would have begun with the plan an that Mr. Liddy developed, Senator GURNEY. 'Now, who recommended Mr. Liddy to the Committee To Re-Elect the President.? [00.26.19-attempting to imply a huge DEAN-led conspiracy?] Mr. DEAN. I passed on a recommendation that I had received from Mr. Krogh to Mr. Mitchell and he in turn endorsed that recommendation and sent, him over to the Re-Election Committee. Senator GURNEY. In other words, you recommended Mr. Liddy to the, Committee To Re-Elect the President? Mr. DEAN. That is correct. Senator GURNEY. Did you interview Mr. Liddy after Krogh recommended him to you? Mr. DEAN. Not, to my recollection, no. I was present when he was interviewed by Mr. Mitchell and again when he was interviewed by Mr. Magruder. Senator GURNEY. Did you ask any questions about his qualifications at that time or did Mr. Liddy just simply answer questions? Mr. DEAN. I asked Mr. Krogh about his qualifications at that, time when he first mentioned him to me. And they asked questions during those interviews, yes. Senator GURNEY. Did you ever ask him what he had been doing for Mr. Krogh? Mr. DEAN. No, I did not. Senator GURNEY. Or Mr. Hunt? Mr. DEAN. No, I did not. [00.27.24]
JFK Assassination Hearings - E. Aschkenasy & Mark Weiss, H.B. McClain
U.S. House Representative Louis Stokes (D-OH) calls and swears in H.B. McClain. Deputy Chief Counsel Gary T. Cornwell is recognized to question McClain. Cornwell confirms McClain's background and that he was part of the 1963 motorcade. Cornwell introduces an exhibit into the committee's record.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities, June 27, 1973 (1/2)
[00.12.50-Sen. INOUYE confronts DEAN with a memo prepared by the WHITE HOUSE, using it as a form of cross-examination-THE MEMO IS ACTUALLY PRETTY FUNNY IN IT'S ATTEMPT TO "BLAME IT ALL ON DEAN", it's so blatantly transparent that it's sad, actually] Senator INOUYE. [continues reading] [QUOTING FROM WHITE HOUSE MEMORANDUM] Whatever the facts may be on the matters that are uncertain in the spring of 1972 about Dean's knowledge or specific approval of the break-in, it must have been clear to Dean as a lawyer when he heard on June 17 of Watergate that he was in personal difficulty. The Watergate affair was too clearly the outgrowth of the discussions and plans he had been in on that he might well be regarded as a conspirator with regard to them. He must immediately have realized that his patron Mitchell, would also be involved. It appears that Ehrlichman called Dean on June 17 to advise him of the problem and to direct him to take charge of it for the White House. Even without an instruction this would have been his responsibility as counsel for the President, from the time Or the occurrence and he was active in that role from the moment of his return to the city a day or two after the break-in, This is a statement from Mr. Ehrlichman's deposition. On June 19, Dean met with Liddy, Mitchell, Strachan and Magruder and Sloan. Dean, Mitchell, and Magruder also met with LaRue and Mardian that evening at Mitchell's apartment, At these meetings the coverup plan was hatched-- This is from the Magruder testimony-- A Series of meetings followed throughout the summer. [END QUOTED SECTION FROM W.H. MEMORANDUM ATTACKING DEAN] [00.14.11] Mr. DEAN. Senator, I just might footnote as you go along. I believe, that the policy regarding the coverup was set, long before I returned from the Far East over the weekend of the break-in and -when I came, to the office and talked to Mr. Strachan 'I realized that the White House already decided initially that it was going to start, destroying incriminating documents and certainly was not going to step forward as to what its knowledge Of the matter was at that, point in time. Senator INOUYE. If I may ask at this point, when you refer to the White House had decided, who do you mean by the White House? Mr. DEAN. I am sorry. Senator, I did not hear you. Senator INOUYE. You have just testified that the White House had decided. Mr. DEAN. Well, I mean by that that certainly Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman, because 'Mr. Haldeman had given specific instructions to Mr. Strachan to destroy the incriminating documents that were in his possession. [00.15.12] Senator INOUYE. [QUOTING FROM WHITE HOUSE MEMORANDUM ATTACKING DEAN] "At these meetings the coverup plan was hatched. A series of meetings followed throughout the summer. Dean and Mitchell were Magruder's principal contacts on the, coverup. Dean was not, merely one of the architects of the coverup plan. He was also its most active participant. Magruder correctly concluded that, Dean 'was involved in all aspects of this coverup,'" and this is, from the Magruder testimony. "It was Dean who suggested to Haldeman that the FBI was concerned that it, might run into a, CIA operation." This is from Mr. Haldeman, If you wish to comment I hope you will. [00.15.57] Mr. DEAN. Yes. As you recall, when I testified I had been asked by Mr. Ehrlichman to stay abreast of what was happening in the Department of Justice. In my meeting with Mr. Gray, which I believe was on the 21st, Mr. Gray told me of the fact that they had uncovered banking transactions in Mr. Barker's account and were at that time looking for the Dahlberg check and the Mexican money and, indeed, I did report this back as the, reporting channels had been developed to my superiors. Senator INOUYE. Were you truly concerned---- [00.16.38] Senator ERVIN. Suppose you name, the superiors you reported to? Mr. DEAN-. Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman. Senator INOUYE. Were you truly concerned that the, CIA was in fact, involved? Mr. DEAN. I had no idea that the CIA was involved at that point in time. Senator INOUYE. Why did you suggest that, the CIA might be involved? Mr. DEAN. This, as I believe I testified, was not, at this point in time but that was at a later date when I went over to Mr. Gray's again and he told me his theories of the case. I explained these to Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman that one of his theories was that the CIA was involved. I had no idea, that Mr. Haldeman and Mr. Ehrlichman were going to meet with Mr. Helms, and General Walters, that was unknown to me until I subsequently was so informed by Mr. Ehrlichman but not as to the substance of the meeting they had held. [00.17.37]
Church Committee Hearings - Tom Charles Huston
Hart asks again why Hoover did not support the plan - Huston responds that on the record it was because Hoover was against the implementation of the illegal intelligence gathering tactics, however, Huston adds he also believes it was because it called for infringement by other agencies and White House into FBI / his territory
NPACT coverage of Church Committee Hearings - The mystery of the shell fish toxi
Opening title "Senate Hearings on Inteligence Activities" (00:00:27) "NPACT" logo appears (National Public Affairs Center) (00:01:24) Show begins with spinning government agencies titles: CIA, NSA, IRS, FBI - followed by a red image of the capitol - then followed by a copy of the senate resolution to investigate these agencies for illegal, improper or unethical procedures (00:01:36) NPACT's spinning sphere logo appears and narrator introduces correspondents PAUL DUKE and JIM LEHRER (00:02:10) Shot opens to Jim Lehrer on the news set with a monitor behind him reading "Senate Hearings on Intelligence Activities", Paul Duke is to his left but not yet on screen - Lehrer opens by saying the mystery of the poisons remains unsolved and explains that 2 containers of shell fish toxin and cobra venom were stashed in a CIA labratory five years ago in defiance of a presidential order that they be destroyed (00:02:22) Lehrer introduces and summarizes testimony of day's witnesses: Dr. EDWARD SHANTZ an army toxin specialist, CHARLES SENSENEY an army engineer and defense department counsel ROBERT ANDREW (00:03:01) Lehrer introduces show'sl guests NICHOLAS HORAK (?) New York Times reporter and congressman OTIS PIKE chairman of the House Committee on Intelligence (00:03:28) Lehrer hands off to Paul Duke - an image of a skull and cross bones comes on to the monitor - Duke explains how extremely deadly the shell fish toxins which were found are and how a Dr. JAMES BOND of Georgetown University received a sample of them, coincidentally his zip code happened to end 007 (00:04:24)
Watergate Hearings: Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities June 25, 1973 - Testimony of John Dean.
Following this brief telephone skirmish regarding Hunt's traveling plans, the meeting turned to Hunt's status at the White House. I had learned from Fred Fielding, who I had asked to check on it, that Hunt had not drawn a check from his White House consultantship since late March of 1972. But as far as I knew the records indicated that Hunt was still a White House consultant to Colson. After discussions of this by Colson, who at this point was disowning Hunt as a member of his staff, Ehrlichman called Mr. Bruce Kehrli and requested he bring Hunt's personnel records up to Ehrlichman's office. Before, Kehrli arrived, Colson raised the matter of Hunt's safe. Colson without getting specific said it was imperative that someone get the contents of Hunt's safe. Colson suggested and Ehrlichman concurred that I take custody of the contents of the safe. When Kehrli arrived he was quizzed by Ehrlichman and Colson on Hunt's status at the White House. Colson was arguing that Hunt should have been removed from the White House as of March 31, 1972. Kehrli's records, however, did not so indicate. I have submitted to the committee, exhibit 13A, memorandums that Colson forwarded to me on June 19, presenting his argument. This was later resolved between Colson and Kehrli pursuant to Colson's argument. I always assumed that this required some alteration of the records, but I do not know this for a fact.